Working Papers
Results of search: (keywords contains 'turnout')
28 records found
Racial Polarization and Turnout in Louisiana: New Insights from Aggregate Data Analysis
Palmquist, Bradley, Voss, D. Stephen
Submitted: 1995-11-30
Keywords: ecological inference, aggregate data, turnout, South, racial polarization, redistricting
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper applies recent developments in aggregate data analysis to newly assembled precinct-level datasets for Louisiana. We validate the usefulness of these methods for answering common voting behavior questions, such as estimating racial polarization/cohesion and predicting racial turnout rates, by applying them to known crosstabulations of turnout by race and party in Louisiana. Then we take the analysis a step further to show how the methods can be used to estimate unknown statistics relevant to redistricting litigation (and their uncertainty) using as much information as possible. In addition to the methodological insights, we draw some substantive conclusions about racial voting behavior and racial mobilization in the South.
Palmquist, Bradley, Voss, D. Stephen
Submitted: 1995-11-30
Keywords: ecological inference, aggregate data, turnout, South, racial polarization, redistricting
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper applies recent developments in aggregate data analysis to newly assembled precinct-level datasets for Louisiana. We validate the usefulness of these methods for answering common voting behavior questions, such as estimating racial polarization/cohesion and predicting racial turnout rates, by applying them to known crosstabulations of turnout by race and party in Louisiana. Then we take the analysis a step further to show how the methods can be used to estimate unknown statistics relevant to redistricting litigation (and their uncertainty) using as much information as possible. In addition to the methodological insights, we draw some substantive conclusions about racial voting behavior and racial mobilization in the South.
Voter Turnout and the Life Cycle: A Latent Growth Curve Analysis
Plutzer, Eric
Submitted: 1997-04-09
Keywords: turnout, life-cycle, random effects model, HLM, latent growth models
Abstract: (click to show/hide) The distinctive relationship between age and voter turnout has intrigued students of electoral behavior since at least the early 1960s. Nevertheless, political scientists actually know little about how individuals acquire the habit of voting during young adulthood. Moreover, previous speculations and explanations are all questionable because they are based on data and models that are inappropriate for what is essentially a developmental process. Problems include confounding age with generational effects, assumptions of reversibility of gains in participation from key life events, and a failure account for the fact that an individual's probability of turnout at any particular age is a function of two distinct latent variables: their turnout rate in the very first elections, and their subsequent rate of increase. Theory construction is muddled because these two variables are negatively correlated and have different predictors. This study uses longitudinal data covering young voters over their first four presidential elections and uses latent growth curve models -- a special case of multi-level or Hierarchical Linear Models which are finding wide applicability in the social sciences. Given appropriate data, this approach permits statistical models that better correspond to life-cycle hypotheses. The findings clarify the role of parental influence, marriage and parenthood, while raising questions about the costs of mobility.
Plutzer, Eric
Submitted: 1997-04-09
Keywords: turnout, life-cycle, random effects model, HLM, latent growth models
Abstract: (click to show/hide) The distinctive relationship between age and voter turnout has intrigued students of electoral behavior since at least the early 1960s. Nevertheless, political scientists actually know little about how individuals acquire the habit of voting during young adulthood. Moreover, previous speculations and explanations are all questionable because they are based on data and models that are inappropriate for what is essentially a developmental process. Problems include confounding age with generational effects, assumptions of reversibility of gains in participation from key life events, and a failure account for the fact that an individual's probability of turnout at any particular age is a function of two distinct latent variables: their turnout rate in the very first elections, and their subsequent rate of increase. Theory construction is muddled because these two variables are negatively correlated and have different predictors. This study uses longitudinal data covering young voters over their first four presidential elections and uses latent growth curve models -- a special case of multi-level or Hierarchical Linear Models which are finding wide applicability in the social sciences. Given appropriate data, this approach permits statistical models that better correspond to life-cycle hypotheses. The findings clarify the role of parental influence, marriage and parenthood, while raising questions about the costs of mobility.
Non-Compulsory Voting in Australia?: what surveys can (and can't) tell us
Jackman, Simon
Submitted: 1997-08-25
Keywords: turnout, Australian politics, compulsory voting, political participation, counter-factuals, surveys, non-response, measurement error, social-desirability heuristic, question-order effects, simulation, parametric bootstrap
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Compulsory voting has come under close scrutiny in recent Australian political debate, and influential voices within the (conservative) Coalition government have called for its repeal. Conventional wisdom holds that a repeal of compulsory voting would result in a sizeable electoral boost for the Coalition; the proportion of Coalition voters who would not vote is thought to be smaller than the corresponding proportion of Labor voters. But estimates of Coalition gains under a return to voluntary turnout are quite rough-and-ready, relying on methods hampered by critical shortcomings. In this paper I focus on assessing the counter-factual of non-compulsory turnout via surveys: while turnout is compulsory in Australia, responding to surveys isn't, and the problems raised by high rates of non-response are especially pernicious in attempting to assess the counter-factual of voluntary turnout. Among survey respondents, social-desirability and question-order effects also encourage over-reports of the likelihood of voluntarily turning out. Taking non-response and measurement error into consideration, I conclude that survey-based estimates (a) significantly \emph{under-estimate} the extent to which turnout would \emph{decline} under a voluntary turnout regime; but (b) \emph{over-estimate} the extent to which a fall in turnout would work to the advantage of the Coalition parties. Nonetheless, the larger of the Coalition parties --- the Liberal Party --- unambiguously increases its vote share under a wide range of assumptions about who does and doesn't voluntarily turnout.
Jackman, Simon
Submitted: 1997-08-25
Keywords: turnout, Australian politics, compulsory voting, political participation, counter-factuals, surveys, non-response, measurement error, social-desirability heuristic, question-order effects, simulation, parametric bootstrap
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Compulsory voting has come under close scrutiny in recent Australian political debate, and influential voices within the (conservative) Coalition government have called for its repeal. Conventional wisdom holds that a repeal of compulsory voting would result in a sizeable electoral boost for the Coalition; the proportion of Coalition voters who would not vote is thought to be smaller than the corresponding proportion of Labor voters. But estimates of Coalition gains under a return to voluntary turnout are quite rough-and-ready, relying on methods hampered by critical shortcomings. In this paper I focus on assessing the counter-factual of non-compulsory turnout via surveys: while turnout is compulsory in Australia, responding to surveys isn't, and the problems raised by high rates of non-response are especially pernicious in attempting to assess the counter-factual of voluntary turnout. Among survey respondents, social-desirability and question-order effects also encourage over-reports of the likelihood of voluntarily turning out. Taking non-response and measurement error into consideration, I conclude that survey-based estimates (a) significantly \emph{under-estimate} the extent to which turnout would \emph{decline} under a voluntary turnout regime; but (b) \emph{over-estimate} the extent to which a fall in turnout would work to the advantage of the Coalition parties. Nonetheless, the larger of the Coalition parties --- the Liberal Party --- unambiguously increases its vote share under a wide range of assumptions about who does and doesn't voluntarily turnout.
A Test for Conformity in Voting Behavior
Coleman, Stephen
Submitted: 1997-11-10
Keywords: voting, turnout, political parties, conformity, entropy, mathematical model, United States, Germany, Japan, Russia
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This working paper shows how to test for the effect of social conformity on voting behavior, including its effect on voter turnout, the distribution of votes among political parties, and the relationship between turnout and party voting. A mathematical model is constructed that leads to specific predictions that are tested on national elections in several countries. Examples are shown graphically from presidential elections in the United States and parliamentary elections in Japan, Germany, Austria, and Russia. The predictions and results contrast with predictions of rational voting theory.
Coleman, Stephen
Submitted: 1997-11-10
Keywords: voting, turnout, political parties, conformity, entropy, mathematical model, United States, Germany, Japan, Russia
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This working paper shows how to test for the effect of social conformity on voting behavior, including its effect on voter turnout, the distribution of votes among political parties, and the relationship between turnout and party voting. A mathematical model is constructed that leads to specific predictions that are tested on national elections in several countries. Examples are shown graphically from presidential elections in the United States and parliamentary elections in Japan, Germany, Austria, and Russia. The predictions and results contrast with predictions of rational voting theory.
Who Votes By Mail? A Dynamic Model of the Individual-Level Consequences of Vote-by-Mail Systems
Berinsky, Adam, Burns, Nancy, Traugott, Michael
Submitted: 1998-04-17
Keywords: turnout, vote-by-mail, duration analysis, continuous-time multistate duration model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Throughout the years, a number of changes have been proposed to electoral laws with the aim of increasing voter turnout and altering the composition of the electorate to make it more reflective of the voting age population. The most recent of these innovations is voting-by-mail (VBM). While the use of VBM has spread through the United States, little empirical evaluation of the impact of VBM has been undertaken to date. The analysis presented here fills this gap in our knowledge by assessing the impact of VBM on the Oregon electorate through a multistate duration analysis (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Heckman and Walker, 1986, 1991) that takes into account other factors associated with election administration and characteristics of individual voters. This methodology has the added advantage of providing a reasonable basis for extrapolation of these effects to other jurisdictions. The results of our research suggest that VBM does increase voter turnout in the aggregate, although its effects are not uniform across all groups in the electorate. More importantly, it does not seem to exert any influence on the partisan composition of the electorate. From a methodological perspective, the use of a multistate duration analysis provides a promising approach to extrapolating the impact of a policy change from one jurisdiction to another when appropriate data are available in each.
Berinsky, Adam, Burns, Nancy, Traugott, Michael
Submitted: 1998-04-17
Keywords: turnout, vote-by-mail, duration analysis, continuous-time multistate duration model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Throughout the years, a number of changes have been proposed to electoral laws with the aim of increasing voter turnout and altering the composition of the electorate to make it more reflective of the voting age population. The most recent of these innovations is voting-by-mail (VBM). While the use of VBM has spread through the United States, little empirical evaluation of the impact of VBM has been undertaken to date. The analysis presented here fills this gap in our knowledge by assessing the impact of VBM on the Oregon electorate through a multistate duration analysis (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Heckman and Walker, 1986, 1991) that takes into account other factors associated with election administration and characteristics of individual voters. This methodology has the added advantage of providing a reasonable basis for extrapolation of these effects to other jurisdictions. The results of our research suggest that VBM does increase voter turnout in the aggregate, although its effects are not uniform across all groups in the electorate. More importantly, it does not seem to exert any influence on the partisan composition of the electorate. From a methodological perspective, the use of a multistate duration analysis provides a promising approach to extrapolating the impact of a policy change from one jurisdiction to another when appropriate data are available in each.
The Presidential Election of 1988: Low Voter Turnout and the Defeat of Michael Dukakis
Herron, Michael C.
Submitted: 1998-05-18
Keywords: turnout, abstention, 1988 election, Heckman model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper studies voting and abstention in the 1988 presidential election and in particular focuses on one of the election's more noteworthy features: voter turnout in 1988 was 50.1%, low even by American presidential election standards. In light of such a low turnout rate, we ask the following two questions: did low voter turnout in 1988 harm the Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis or his Republican counterpart George Bush? And, if the full franchise had voted in 1988, who would have won the election? According to our estimates, individuals who abstained from voting in 1988 were primarily supporters of Dukakis, and we find that Dukakis would almost certainly have won the 1988 election had the full franchise voted. The bottom line is that Bush greatly benefited from low voter turnout, and we conclude that, on account of the dismal turnout rate, the 1988 election outcome was not representative of average citizen preferences. Our findings, based on data from the 1988 American National Election Study, are consonant with other turnout--related research, in particular Radcliff's aggregate study of presidential elections from 1928 to 1980. In contrast with Radcliff's analysis, though, this paper's use of individual--level as opposed to aggregate data allows us to describe the key determinants of voting and abstention in 1988. Our results highlight the deleterious consequences of low voter turnout and imply that efforts to stimulate voting may improve the likelihood that presidential election outcomes are representative of citizen, as opposed to solely voter, preferences.
Herron, Michael C.
Submitted: 1998-05-18
Keywords: turnout, abstention, 1988 election, Heckman model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper studies voting and abstention in the 1988 presidential election and in particular focuses on one of the election's more noteworthy features: voter turnout in 1988 was 50.1%, low even by American presidential election standards. In light of such a low turnout rate, we ask the following two questions: did low voter turnout in 1988 harm the Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis or his Republican counterpart George Bush? And, if the full franchise had voted in 1988, who would have won the election? According to our estimates, individuals who abstained from voting in 1988 were primarily supporters of Dukakis, and we find that Dukakis would almost certainly have won the 1988 election had the full franchise voted. The bottom line is that Bush greatly benefited from low voter turnout, and we conclude that, on account of the dismal turnout rate, the 1988 election outcome was not representative of average citizen preferences. Our findings, based on data from the 1988 American National Election Study, are consonant with other turnout--related research, in particular Radcliff's aggregate study of presidential elections from 1928 to 1980. In contrast with Radcliff's analysis, though, this paper's use of individual--level as opposed to aggregate data allows us to describe the key determinants of voting and abstention in 1988. Our results highlight the deleterious consequences of low voter turnout and imply that efforts to stimulate voting may improve the likelihood that presidential election outcomes are representative of citizen, as opposed to solely voter, preferences.
Indifference, Voting, and Abstention in the 1976 Presidential Election
Herron, Michael C.
Submitted: 1998-05-19
Keywords: 1976 election, indifference, abstention, turnout, voting
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper develops a statistical model of voting and abstention and applies it to the presidential election of 1976, a contest between incumbent president Gerald Ford and Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter. Our model is grounded in random utility theory, and, unlike many extant models of voting and abstention, its treatment of turnout focuses on the distinction between political extremists and individuals who were close to indifferent between Ford and Carter. We expect that individuals close to indifferent abstained at lower rates than political extremists. And, in light of research which highlights relatively high abstention rates among Democratic supporters, our model allows politically--left extremists to abstain at different rates than politically--right extremists. We uncover some evidence that indifference between Ford and Carter exerted a downward influence on voting propensity in 1976. However, there is much stronger evidence that individuals who were politically--left extremists abstained at higher rates than all others. We also find that individuals who anticipated a close election in 1976 voted at higher rates than those who expected a lopsided victory. The value of the paper's model is its focus on the relation between abstention and strength of preference. Generalizations and applications of the model to additional presidential elections should foster a determination of whether indifference is as important to abstention as is politically--left extremism.
Herron, Michael C.
Submitted: 1998-05-19
Keywords: 1976 election, indifference, abstention, turnout, voting
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper develops a statistical model of voting and abstention and applies it to the presidential election of 1976, a contest between incumbent president Gerald Ford and Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter. Our model is grounded in random utility theory, and, unlike many extant models of voting and abstention, its treatment of turnout focuses on the distinction between political extremists and individuals who were close to indifferent between Ford and Carter. We expect that individuals close to indifferent abstained at lower rates than political extremists. And, in light of research which highlights relatively high abstention rates among Democratic supporters, our model allows politically--left extremists to abstain at different rates than politically--right extremists. We uncover some evidence that indifference between Ford and Carter exerted a downward influence on voting propensity in 1976. However, there is much stronger evidence that individuals who were politically--left extremists abstained at higher rates than all others. We also find that individuals who anticipated a close election in 1976 voted at higher rates than those who expected a lopsided victory. The value of the paper's model is its focus on the relation between abstention and strength of preference. Generalizations and applications of the model to additional presidential elections should foster a determination of whether indifference is as important to abstention as is politically--left extremism.
Economic Performance, Job Insecurity, and Electoral Choice
Lacy, Dean, Mughan, Anthony
Submitted: 1998-09-17
Keywords: economic voting, economic insecurity, Perot, turnout, multinomial probit, 1996 election
Abstract: (click to show/hide) The mass political economy literature concentrates on egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of short-term economic performance. Scant attention is paid to other economic concerns people may have. In a neo-liberal economic climate characterized by a downsized labor market and the retrenchment of government welfare entitlements, one such widely-publicized concern is job insecurity. We show that job insecurity is a novel form of discontent that is independent of the retrospective evaluations of short-term performance that are the stuff of the mainstream mass political economy literature. At the same time, the political effects of job insecurity are distinctive. In a multinomial probit model of electoral choice in the 1996 U.S. presidential election, job insecurity is associated with support for the third-party candidate, Ross Perot, but, contrary to conventional wisdom, has no implications for turnout. Traditional retrospective evaluations of economic performance explain the major-party vote and abstention.
Lacy, Dean, Mughan, Anthony
Submitted: 1998-09-17
Keywords: economic voting, economic insecurity, Perot, turnout, multinomial probit, 1996 election
Abstract: (click to show/hide) The mass political economy literature concentrates on egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of short-term economic performance. Scant attention is paid to other economic concerns people may have. In a neo-liberal economic climate characterized by a downsized labor market and the retrenchment of government welfare entitlements, one such widely-publicized concern is job insecurity. We show that job insecurity is a novel form of discontent that is independent of the retrospective evaluations of short-term performance that are the stuff of the mainstream mass political economy literature. At the same time, the political effects of job insecurity are distinctive. In a multinomial probit model of electoral choice in the 1996 U.S. presidential election, job insecurity is associated with support for the third-party candidate, Ross Perot, but, contrary to conventional wisdom, has no implications for turnout. Traditional retrospective evaluations of economic performance explain the major-party vote and abstention.
Measuring Voter Turnout in the National Election Studies
Burden, Barry C.
Submitted: 1999-08-26
Keywords: voter turnout, NES, overreport, response rates
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Though the overreport of voter turnout in the National Election Study (NES) is widely known, this paper documents that the bias has become increasingly severe. The gap between NES and official estimates of presidential election has more than doubled from 11 points in 1952 to 28 points 1996. This occurred because official voter turnout fell steadily from 1960 onward while NES turnout did not. In contrast, the bias in House election turnout is always smaller and has increased only marginally over time, mostly due to inflation in presidential election years. I find that worsening presidential turnout estimates are mostly the result of declining response rates rather than instrumentation, question wording changes, or other factors. Adjusting official turnout estimates to more accurately measure real turnout does not account for the growing gap. Rather, as more peripheral voters elude interviewers in recent years, the NES sample becomes more saturated with self-reported voters, thus inflating reported turnout. The paper concludes by calling for a reevaluation of the NES in the wake of these and other changes that have taken place.
Burden, Barry C.
Submitted: 1999-08-26
Keywords: voter turnout, NES, overreport, response rates
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Though the overreport of voter turnout in the National Election Study (NES) is widely known, this paper documents that the bias has become increasingly severe. The gap between NES and official estimates of presidential election has more than doubled from 11 points in 1952 to 28 points 1996. This occurred because official voter turnout fell steadily from 1960 onward while NES turnout did not. In contrast, the bias in House election turnout is always smaller and has increased only marginally over time, mostly due to inflation in presidential election years. I find that worsening presidential turnout estimates are mostly the result of declining response rates rather than instrumentation, question wording changes, or other factors. Adjusting official turnout estimates to more accurately measure real turnout does not account for the growing gap. Rather, as more peripheral voters elude interviewers in recent years, the NES sample becomes more saturated with self-reported voters, thus inflating reported turnout. The paper concludes by calling for a reevaluation of the NES in the wake of these and other changes that have taken place.
Coordination, Moderation and Institutional Balancing in American House Elections at Midterm
Mebane, Walter R., Sekhon, Jasjeet
Submitted: 1999-09-02
Keywords: congressional elections, rational expectations, voter equilibrium, midterm cycle, stochastic choice model, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Individuals' turnout decisions and vote choices for the House of Representatives have been coordinated in recent midterm election years, with each eligible voter (each elector) using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a rational expectations equilibrium among electors, in which each elector has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level data from the American National Election Study Post-Election Surveys of years 1978-1998 support coordination, but a model in which electors act non-strategically to moderate policy has very similar behavioral implications and also works well. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixed point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation electors have about the election outcome in the equilibrium of the theoretical model. Both the coordinating and non-strategic models are capable of generating a midterm cycle in which the President's party usually loses vote share at midterm. Both models correctly flag 1998 as an exception to that pattern: the Republican party had policy positions that were too conservative for most electors. Moderation at midterm has usually been based on electors' expectations that the House will dominate the President in determining post-election policy.
Mebane, Walter R., Sekhon, Jasjeet
Submitted: 1999-09-02
Keywords: congressional elections, rational expectations, voter equilibrium, midterm cycle, stochastic choice model, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Individuals' turnout decisions and vote choices for the House of Representatives have been coordinated in recent midterm election years, with each eligible voter (each elector) using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a rational expectations equilibrium among electors, in which each elector has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level data from the American National Election Study Post-Election Surveys of years 1978-1998 support coordination, but a model in which electors act non-strategically to moderate policy has very similar behavioral implications and also works well. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixed point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation electors have about the election outcome in the equilibrium of the theoretical model. Both the coordinating and non-strategic models are capable of generating a midterm cycle in which the President's party usually loses vote share at midterm. Both models correctly flag 1998 as an exception to that pattern: the Republican party had policy positions that were too conservative for most electors. Moderation at midterm has usually been based on electors' expectations that the House will dominate the President in determining post-election policy.
The `Turnout Twist' in Japanese Elections
Horiuchi, Yusaku
Submitted: 1999-09-07
Keywords: voter turnout, Japanese elections, local elections, multiple imputation, random-effect model, simulation
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In the United States, as well as in most other democracies, national elections usually attract more votes than local elections. In Japan, they attract more votes in large municipalities but attract less votes in small municipalities. This paper attempts to explain such a puzzling turnout pattern, which is defined as the ``turnout twist''. The random-effect model estimation and the post-estimation simulation find that the most important variable explaining the turnout twist is the voting-age population per seat. The simulation analysis shows that if this variable did not have any significant effect, national elections would attract more votes than local elections in all municipalities. Since this variable itself and its effect on turnout are largely determined by the disproportional apportionment of seats in both national and local elections, the restrictive regulations to mobilizational activities, and the minimal roles played by political parties in mobilizing votes under the multimember constituency system, the paper concludes that the puzzling turnout twist observed in Japanese elections is a product of Japan's unique institutional arrangements.
Horiuchi, Yusaku
Submitted: 1999-09-07
Keywords: voter turnout, Japanese elections, local elections, multiple imputation, random-effect model, simulation
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In the United States, as well as in most other democracies, national elections usually attract more votes than local elections. In Japan, they attract more votes in large municipalities but attract less votes in small municipalities. This paper attempts to explain such a puzzling turnout pattern, which is defined as the ``turnout twist''. The random-effect model estimation and the post-estimation simulation find that the most important variable explaining the turnout twist is the voting-age population per seat. The simulation analysis shows that if this variable did not have any significant effect, national elections would attract more votes than local elections in all municipalities. Since this variable itself and its effect on turnout are largely determined by the disproportional apportionment of seats in both national and local elections, the restrictive regulations to mobilizational activities, and the minimal roles played by political parties in mobilizing votes under the multimember constituency system, the paper concludes that the puzzling turnout twist observed in Japanese elections is a product of Japan's unique institutional arrangements.
The Vote-Stealing and Turnout Effects of Third-Party Candidates in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1968-1996
Lacy, Dean, Burden, Barry C.
Submitted: 2000-03-03
Keywords: vote choice, turnout, third parties, multinomial probit
Abstract: (click to show/hide) A multinomial probit model of electoral choice in the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 U.S. presidential elections, estimated using data from the American National Election Studies, reveals similarities and differences in electoral support for George Wallace, John Anderson, and Ross Perot. Estimates from the models are used to simulate the outcomes of the elections in the absence of the third-party candidate and under full turnout. In three of the four elections, the third-party candidates stole more votes from the challengers than from the incumbents. Only in 1996 did the third-party candidate take more votes away from the incumbent than the challenger. None of the four third-party candidacies increased turnout by more than 2.3 percentage points, and Perot's 1996 candidacy had the smallest impact on turnout of all of the third-party candidacies. Under full turnout, the outcome of only one election - 1968 - may have changed. All four third-party candidates increase their vote share under full turnout, and Democratic candidates gain vote share under full turnout in all elections except 1980. The paper also describes a new method for estimating the error variances and covariances in an MNP model.
Lacy, Dean, Burden, Barry C.
Submitted: 2000-03-03
Keywords: vote choice, turnout, third parties, multinomial probit
Abstract: (click to show/hide) A multinomial probit model of electoral choice in the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 U.S. presidential elections, estimated using data from the American National Election Studies, reveals similarities and differences in electoral support for George Wallace, John Anderson, and Ross Perot. Estimates from the models are used to simulate the outcomes of the elections in the absence of the third-party candidate and under full turnout. In three of the four elections, the third-party candidates stole more votes from the challengers than from the incumbents. Only in 1996 did the third-party candidate take more votes away from the incumbent than the challenger. None of the four third-party candidacies increased turnout by more than 2.3 percentage points, and Perot's 1996 candidacy had the smallest impact on turnout of all of the third-party candidacies. Under full turnout, the outcome of only one election - 1968 - may have changed. All four third-party candidates increase their vote share under full turnout, and Democratic candidates gain vote share under full turnout in all elections except 1980. The paper also describes a new method for estimating the error variances and covariances in an MNP model.
Anatomy of a Third-Party Victory: Electoral Support for Jesse Ventura in the 1998 Minnesota Gubernatorial Election
Lacy, Dean, Monson, Quin
Submitted: 2000-04-24
Keywords: vote-stealing, turnout, third-party, Condorcet winner, multinomial probit
Abstract: (click to show/hide) [not transcribed]
Lacy, Dean, Monson, Quin
Submitted: 2000-04-24
Keywords: vote-stealing, turnout, third-party, Condorcet winner, multinomial probit
Abstract: (click to show/hide) [not transcribed]
Turnout Effects on the Composition of the Electorate: A Multinomial Logit Simulation of the 2000 Presidential Election
Martinez, Michael
Submitted: 2002-03-18
Keywords: turnout, multinomial logit, simulation
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Conventional wisdom among pundits and some scholars posits that higher turnout should benefit liberal parties, since lower socioeconomic classes comprise a disproportionate share of the nonvoting population. Empirical tests of this prediction across elections have produced a wide variety of results, ranging from support for the conventional wisdom to suggestions that Republicans benefit from higher turnout to null findings. In this paper, we provide a simulation of the possible impact of increasing or decreasing turnout in a single election. Using data from the 2000 American National Election Study, we find that Gore would have benefitted slightly from higher turnout and would have been harmed slightly by lower turnout, but the overall magnitude of the effects of turnout on Gore's share of the two party vote is small. At higher levels of turnout, Democrats comprise a larger share of the electorate, but they also have a higher defection rate.
Martinez, Michael
Submitted: 2002-03-18
Keywords: turnout, multinomial logit, simulation
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Conventional wisdom among pundits and some scholars posits that higher turnout should benefit liberal parties, since lower socioeconomic classes comprise a disproportionate share of the nonvoting population. Empirical tests of this prediction across elections have produced a wide variety of results, ranging from support for the conventional wisdom to suggestions that Republicans benefit from higher turnout to null findings. In this paper, we provide a simulation of the possible impact of increasing or decreasing turnout in a single election. Using data from the 2000 American National Election Study, we find that Gore would have benefitted slightly from higher turnout and would have been harmed slightly by lower turnout, but the overall magnitude of the effects of turnout on Gore's share of the two party vote is small. At higher levels of turnout, Democrats comprise a larger share of the electorate, but they also have a higher defection rate.
Rational Voting
Gelman, Andrew, Kaplan, Noah, Edlin, Aaron
Submitted: 2002-08-02
Keywords: elections, rational choice, sociotropic voting, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) By separating the assumptions of ``rationality'' and ``selfishness,'' we show that it can be rational to vote if one is motivated by the effects of the election on society as a whole. For voters with ``social'' preferences the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. We show how this feedback mechanism distinguishes voting from other free-rider problems. Our theory is consistent with several empirical findings in political science, including survey results that suggest that people vote based on perceived social benefit, the positive relation between turnout and (anticipated) closeness of the election, other forms of political participation, and declining response rates in opinion polls. Since our ''social'' theory of rational voting is instrumental, it creates a rich foundation to study {\em how} people vote as well as why. A rational person should make voting decisions almost entirely based on perceived social benefits of the election outcome.
Gelman, Andrew, Kaplan, Noah, Edlin, Aaron
Submitted: 2002-08-02
Keywords: elections, rational choice, sociotropic voting, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) By separating the assumptions of ``rationality'' and ``selfishness,'' we show that it can be rational to vote if one is motivated by the effects of the election on society as a whole. For voters with ``social'' preferences the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. We show how this feedback mechanism distinguishes voting from other free-rider problems. Our theory is consistent with several empirical findings in political science, including survey results that suggest that people vote based on perceived social benefit, the positive relation between turnout and (anticipated) closeness of the election, other forms of political participation, and declining response rates in opinion polls. Since our ''social'' theory of rational voting is instrumental, it creates a rich foundation to study {\em how} people vote as well as why. A rational person should make voting decisions almost entirely based on perceived social benefits of the election outcome.
Have Turnout Effects Really Declined? Testing the Partisan Implications of Marginal Voters
Gill, Jeff, Martinez, Michael
Submitted: 2002-08-09
Keywords: voting, turnout, partisan effects, simulation, multinomial logit
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In this paper, we review the theoretical foundations of the debate about whether higher election turnout advantages left parties, suggest a method of assessing the effects of turnout within a single election, and provide evidence from four U.S. elections that the partisan effects of turnout are contingent on the strength and polarity of the short-term forces. Our methodological approach to addressing whether the Democrats would have benefited from higher turnout (and whether the Republicans would have benefited from lower turnout) in a given election is to employ a new type of simulation based on multinomial logit estimates of the choices made by individual citizens. Our substantive approach is similar to Lacy and Burden (1999), in that we posit that U.S. citizens have three unordered choices in each election: vote Democratic, vote Republican, or abstain. We first estimate vote choice (including the abstention category) as an unordered multinomial logit function of standard variables associated with both candidate preference and the likelihood of voting. From that estimation, we derive probabilities for each respondent's selection of each of the three choices (abstain, vote Democratic, or vote Republican). From those probabilities, we simulate several levels of turnout. Higher turnout is simulated by progressively adding to the pool of voters actual abstainers with the lowest probability of abstaining of those remaining in the pool of abstainers. Whereas lower turnout is simulated by progressively subtracting from the electorate actual voters with the highest probability of abstaining. Our results across the four elections provide partial support for both the conventional SES-based model and the alternative defection-based model, though neither model's predictions are completely borne out empirically. As predicted by the conventional model, we find that the electorate has a greater Democratic tilt at higher levels of turnout, although that relationship has significantly weakened over time.
Gill, Jeff, Martinez, Michael
Submitted: 2002-08-09
Keywords: voting, turnout, partisan effects, simulation, multinomial logit
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In this paper, we review the theoretical foundations of the debate about whether higher election turnout advantages left parties, suggest a method of assessing the effects of turnout within a single election, and provide evidence from four U.S. elections that the partisan effects of turnout are contingent on the strength and polarity of the short-term forces. Our methodological approach to addressing whether the Democrats would have benefited from higher turnout (and whether the Republicans would have benefited from lower turnout) in a given election is to employ a new type of simulation based on multinomial logit estimates of the choices made by individual citizens. Our substantive approach is similar to Lacy and Burden (1999), in that we posit that U.S. citizens have three unordered choices in each election: vote Democratic, vote Republican, or abstain. We first estimate vote choice (including the abstention category) as an unordered multinomial logit function of standard variables associated with both candidate preference and the likelihood of voting. From that estimation, we derive probabilities for each respondent's selection of each of the three choices (abstain, vote Democratic, or vote Republican). From those probabilities, we simulate several levels of turnout. Higher turnout is simulated by progressively adding to the pool of voters actual abstainers with the lowest probability of abstaining of those remaining in the pool of abstainers. Whereas lower turnout is simulated by progressively subtracting from the electorate actual voters with the highest probability of abstaining. Our results across the four elections provide partial support for both the conventional SES-based model and the alternative defection-based model, though neither model's predictions are completely borne out empirically. As predicted by the conventional model, we find that the electorate has a greater Democratic tilt at higher levels of turnout, although that relationship has significantly weakened over time.
Primaries and Turnout
Kanthak, Kristen, Morton, Becky
Submitted: 2003-07-09
Keywords: primaries, turnout, bivariate probit, selection model, treatment effects
Abstract: (click to show/hide) We consider the effects of differences in primary systems on voter turnout in primaries as well as the effect of holding primaries on general election turnout and support for candidates chosen in primaries. The analysis is based on a group majority voting model of turnout where candidates from two major parties simultaneously make strategic entry decisions and mobilize voters strategically in primaries and general elections if they choose to enter. We evaluate the model's predictions using data from midterm Congressional primaries and general elections in the 1980s. We use a two-stage estimation process. First, the model's predictions concerning the effects of primary system differences on whether primaries occur and the vote totals in primaries is estimated using a maximum likelihood bivariate probit selection model. We find that primary system variables do have significant effects on whether primaries are held and to some extent affect vote totals in primaries, although there are interesting party specific differences suggesting that Republicans see advantages from mobilizing voters in open primary systems while Democrats benefit in semi-closed primary systems. Second, the estimated vote totals in the primaries are used as treatment variables via an instrumental variables approach in a simultaneous equation system with two dependent variables general election vote totals and the vote share of the Democratic party's candidate. We find that voting in primaries has a positive and significant effect on voting in general elections and significantly increase the vote share of the party holding the primary, suggesting that the arguments that primaries by their existence decrease voter turnout and hurt parties holding them have no support.
Kanthak, Kristen, Morton, Becky
Submitted: 2003-07-09
Keywords: primaries, turnout, bivariate probit, selection model, treatment effects
Abstract: (click to show/hide) We consider the effects of differences in primary systems on voter turnout in primaries as well as the effect of holding primaries on general election turnout and support for candidates chosen in primaries. The analysis is based on a group majority voting model of turnout where candidates from two major parties simultaneously make strategic entry decisions and mobilize voters strategically in primaries and general elections if they choose to enter. We evaluate the model's predictions using data from midterm Congressional primaries and general elections in the 1980s. We use a two-stage estimation process. First, the model's predictions concerning the effects of primary system differences on whether primaries occur and the vote totals in primaries is estimated using a maximum likelihood bivariate probit selection model. We find that primary system variables do have significant effects on whether primaries are held and to some extent affect vote totals in primaries, although there are interesting party specific differences suggesting that Republicans see advantages from mobilizing voters in open primary systems while Democrats benefit in semi-closed primary systems. Second, the estimated vote totals in the primaries are used as treatment variables via an instrumental variables approach in a simultaneous equation system with two dependent variables general election vote totals and the vote share of the Democratic party's candidate. We find that voting in primaries has a positive and significant effect on voting in general elections and significantly increase the vote share of the party holding the primary, suggesting that the arguments that primaries by their existence decrease voter turnout and hurt parties holding them have no support.
Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector
Falaschetti, Dino
Submitted: 2004-06-15
Keywords: Electoral Institutions, Voter Turnout, Capture Theory, Regulatory Commitment, Telecommunications Policy, Economic Welfare
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Voter turnout is popularly cited as reflecting a polity's health. The ease with which electoral members influence policy can, however, constrain an economy's productive capacity. For example, while influential electorates might carefully monitor political agents, they might also "capture" them. In the latter case, electorates transfer producer surplus to consumers at the expense of social welfare - i.e., a "healthy" polity's economy rests at an inferior equilibrium. I develop evidence that the US telecommunications sector may have realized such an outcome. This evidence is remarkably difficult to dismiss as an artifact of endogeneity bias, and appears important for several audiences. For example, the normative regulation literature calls for constraints on producers' market power, while the institutions and commitment literature calls for checks on political agents' opportunism. Evidence that I develop here suggests that, unbound by similar constraints, electoral principals might effectively control their political agents while significantly retarding their economic agents' productive incentives.
Falaschetti, Dino
Submitted: 2004-06-15
Keywords: Electoral Institutions, Voter Turnout, Capture Theory, Regulatory Commitment, Telecommunications Policy, Economic Welfare
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Voter turnout is popularly cited as reflecting a polity's health. The ease with which electoral members influence policy can, however, constrain an economy's productive capacity. For example, while influential electorates might carefully monitor political agents, they might also "capture" them. In the latter case, electorates transfer producer surplus to consumers at the expense of social welfare - i.e., a "healthy" polity's economy rests at an inferior equilibrium. I develop evidence that the US telecommunications sector may have realized such an outcome. This evidence is remarkably difficult to dismiss as an artifact of endogeneity bias, and appears important for several audiences. For example, the normative regulation literature calls for constraints on producers' market power, while the institutions and commitment literature calls for checks on political agents' opportunism. Evidence that I develop here suggests that, unbound by similar constraints, electoral principals might effectively control their political agents while significantly retarding their economic agents' productive incentives.
Unions and Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964-2000
Leighley, Jan, Nagler, Jonathan
Submitted: 2005-05-20
Keywords: turnout, voting, elections. unions
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper examines the impact of unions on turnout and assesses the consequences of the dramatic decline in union strength since 1964 for the composition of the U.S. electorate. Our analysis relies on individual-level data from 1964 through 2000. We first estimate individual-level models to test for the distinct effects of union membership and union strength on individuals' probabilities of voting and then test whether the effect of individual union membership and overall union strength varies across income levels. We find that unions increase turnout by increasing turnout of union members as well as turnout of non-members. And we find that the effects of union mobilization are approximately equal for the bottom two thirds of the income distribution, but are significantly less for the top third of the income distribution. By simulating what turnout would be were union membership at its 1964 level, we show that the decline in union membership since 1964 has led to a substantial increase in class-bias in the electorate.
Leighley, Jan, Nagler, Jonathan
Submitted: 2005-05-20
Keywords: turnout, voting, elections. unions
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper examines the impact of unions on turnout and assesses the consequences of the dramatic decline in union strength since 1964 for the composition of the U.S. electorate. Our analysis relies on individual-level data from 1964 through 2000. We first estimate individual-level models to test for the distinct effects of union membership and union strength on individuals' probabilities of voting and then test whether the effect of individual union membership and overall union strength varies across income levels. We find that unions increase turnout by increasing turnout of union members as well as turnout of non-members. And we find that the effects of union mobilization are approximately equal for the bottom two thirds of the income distribution, but are significantly less for the top third of the income distribution. By simulating what turnout would be were union membership at its 1964 level, we show that the decline in union membership since 1964 has led to a substantial increase in class-bias in the electorate.
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms
Battaglini, Marco, Palfrey, Thomas, Morton, Rebecca
Submitted: 2005-06-19
Keywords: sequential voting, simultaneous voting, costly voting, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In many voting situations some participants know the choices of earlier voters. We show that in such cases and voting is costly, later voters?' decisions are dependent on both the choices of previous voters and the cost of voting and are significantly different from the choices when voting is simultaneous. Using experiments we find support for our predictions. We also ?find that increasing the cost of voting decreases both informational and economic efficiency and subsidizing voting can increase efficiency. We find a tradeoff between efficiency and equity in sequential voting: Although sequential voting is generally more advantageous for all voters than simultaneous voting, there are significant additional advantages to later voters in sequential voting even when early voters are theoretically predicted to benefit.
Battaglini, Marco, Palfrey, Thomas, Morton, Rebecca
Submitted: 2005-06-19
Keywords: sequential voting, simultaneous voting, costly voting, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In many voting situations some participants know the choices of earlier voters. We show that in such cases and voting is costly, later voters?' decisions are dependent on both the choices of previous voters and the cost of voting and are significantly different from the choices when voting is simultaneous. Using experiments we find support for our predictions. We also ?find that increasing the cost of voting decreases both informational and economic efficiency and subsidizing voting can increase efficiency. We find a tradeoff between efficiency and equity in sequential voting: Although sequential voting is generally more advantageous for all voters than simultaneous voting, there are significant additional advantages to later voters in sequential voting even when early voters are theoretically predicted to benefit.
Expressive Bayesian Voters, their Turnout Decisions, and Double Probit
Achen, Christopher
Submitted: 2006-07-17
Keywords: turnout, expressive, Bayesian, probit, scobit, EITM
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Voting is an expressive act. Since people are not born wanting to express themselves politically, the desire to vote must be acquired, either by learning about the candidates, by using party identification as a cognitive shortcut, or by contact from a trusted source. Modeled as Bayesian updating, this simple explanatory framework has dramatic implications for the understanding of voter turnout. It mathematically implies the main empirical generalizations familiar from the literature, it predicts hitherto unnoticed patterns that appear in turnout data, it provides a better fitting statistical model (double probit) for sample surveys of turnout, and it allows researchers to forecast turnout patterns in new elections when circumstances change. Thus the case is strengthened for the Bayesian voter model as a central organizing principle for public opinion and voting behavior.
Achen, Christopher
Submitted: 2006-07-17
Keywords: turnout, expressive, Bayesian, probit, scobit, EITM
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Voting is an expressive act. Since people are not born wanting to express themselves politically, the desire to vote must be acquired, either by learning about the candidates, by using party identification as a cognitive shortcut, or by contact from a trusted source. Modeled as Bayesian updating, this simple explanatory framework has dramatic implications for the understanding of voter turnout. It mathematically implies the main empirical generalizations familiar from the literature, it predicts hitherto unnoticed patterns that appear in turnout data, it provides a better fitting statistical model (double probit) for sample surveys of turnout, and it allows researchers to forecast turnout patterns in new elections when circumstances change. Thus the case is strengthened for the Bayesian voter model as a central organizing principle for public opinion and voting behavior.
The political consequences of transitions out of marriage in Great Britain
Kern, Holger
Submitted: 2007-11-20
Keywords: causal inference, matching, Great Britain, marriage, divorce, widowhood, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper uses British Household Panel Survey data to estimate the effects of divorce and widowhood on political attitudes and political behavior. In contrast to previous research, which mostly relied on cross-sectional data, a matched propensity score analysis does not find any effects of transitions out of marriage on policy preferences, party identification, and vote choice. The results also show that divorce (but not widowhood) substantially reduces electoral participation. Some preliminary evidence suggests that this effect of divorce on turnout is partially attributable to the increased residential mobility that accompanies divorce.
Kern, Holger
Submitted: 2007-11-20
Keywords: causal inference, matching, Great Britain, marriage, divorce, widowhood, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper uses British Household Panel Survey data to estimate the effects of divorce and widowhood on political attitudes and political behavior. In contrast to previous research, which mostly relied on cross-sectional data, a matched propensity score analysis does not find any effects of transitions out of marriage on policy preferences, party identification, and vote choice. The results also show that divorce (but not widowhood) substantially reduces electoral participation. Some preliminary evidence suggests that this effect of divorce on turnout is partially attributable to the increased residential mobility that accompanies divorce.
Partisanship, Voting, and the Dopamine D2 Receptor Gene
Dawes, Christopher, Fowler, James
Submitted: 2008-02-01
Keywords: partisanship, voting, turnout, genetic association, dopamine, DRD2
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Previous studies have found that both political orientations (Alford, Funk & Hibbing 2005) and voting behavior (Fowler, Baker & Dawes 2007, Fowler & Dawes 2007) are significantly heritable. In this article we study genetic variation in another important political behavior: partisan attachment. Using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we show that individuals with the A1 allele of the D2 dopamine receptor gene are significantly less likely to identify as a partisan than those with the A2 allele. Further, we find that this gene's association with partisanship also mediates an indirect association between the A1 allele and voter abstention. These results are the first to identify a specific gene that may be responsible for the tendency to join political groups, and they may help to explain correlation in parent and child partisanship and the persistence of partisan behavior over time.
Dawes, Christopher, Fowler, James
Submitted: 2008-02-01
Keywords: partisanship, voting, turnout, genetic association, dopamine, DRD2
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Previous studies have found that both political orientations (Alford, Funk & Hibbing 2005) and voting behavior (Fowler, Baker & Dawes 2007, Fowler & Dawes 2007) are significantly heritable. In this article we study genetic variation in another important political behavior: partisan attachment. Using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we show that individuals with the A1 allele of the D2 dopamine receptor gene are significantly less likely to identify as a partisan than those with the A2 allele. Further, we find that this gene's association with partisanship also mediates an indirect association between the A1 allele and voter abstention. These results are the first to identify a specific gene that may be responsible for the tendency to join political groups, and they may help to explain correlation in parent and child partisanship and the persistence of partisan behavior over time.
Registration and Voting under Rational Expectations
Achen, Christopher
Submitted: 2008-07-07
Keywords: turnout, registration, Heckman, Dubin-Rivers, expectations
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Alone among modern democracies, the United States makes voter registration a personal responsibility rather than a governmental function. In almost all states, registration deadlines occur well before elections. Failure to register by the deadline makes the probability of voting exactly zero. This sequential feature of the registration and voting decisions has been skipped over by most researchers, who simply ignore registration. Others, notably Timpone (1998), have used the seemingly appropriate Heckman-style selection model, but have arrived at findings difficult to believe. This paper investigates the appropriate choice of a registration model under a rational expectations assumption about the desire to vote, showing that, rather surprisingly, conventional selection models will generally perform less well than ignoring the selection effect of registration entirely. However, neither is quite correct. Finally then, the paper proposes and tests a flexible model for registration as a step toward substantively appropriate joint modeling of registration and voting.
Achen, Christopher
Submitted: 2008-07-07
Keywords: turnout, registration, Heckman, Dubin-Rivers, expectations
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Alone among modern democracies, the United States makes voter registration a personal responsibility rather than a governmental function. In almost all states, registration deadlines occur well before elections. Failure to register by the deadline makes the probability of voting exactly zero. This sequential feature of the registration and voting decisions has been skipped over by most researchers, who simply ignore registration. Others, notably Timpone (1998), have used the seemingly appropriate Heckman-style selection model, but have arrived at findings difficult to believe. This paper investigates the appropriate choice of a registration model under a rational expectations assumption about the desire to vote, showing that, rather surprisingly, conventional selection models will generally perform less well than ignoring the selection effect of registration entirely. However, neither is quite correct. Finally then, the paper proposes and tests a flexible model for registration as a step toward substantively appropriate joint modeling of registration and voting.
Buying Votes with Public Funds in the US Presidential Election: Are Swing or Core Voters Easier to Buy Off?
Chen, Jowei
Submitted: 2008-07-09
Keywords: distributive politics, voting, turnout, elections
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In the aftermath of the summer 2004 Florida hurricane season, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) distributed $1.2 billion in disaster aid among 2.6 million individual applications for assistance. This research measures the relative costs and benefits of using FEMA aid to buy votes from swing voters and core voters. First, I compare precinct-level vote counts and individual voter turnout records from the post-hurricane (November 2004) and pre-hurricane (2000 and 2002) elections to measure the effect of FEMA aid on Bush's vote share. Using a two-stage least squares estimator, with hurricane severity measures as instruments for FEMA aid, this analysis reveals that core Republican voters are most electorally responsive to FEMA aid -- $7,000 buys one additional vote for Bush. By contrast, in moderate precincts, each additional Bush vote costs $21,000, while voters in Democratic neighborhoods are unresponsive to receiving FEMA aid. Additionally, by tracking the geographic location of each aid recipient, the data reveal that FEMA favored applicants from Republican neighborhoods over those from Democratic or moderate neighborhoods, even conditioning on hurricane severity, average home values, and demographics. Collectively, these results demonstrate the Bush administration's disproportionate distribution of FEMA disaster aid toward core Republican areas was the optimal strategy for maximizing votes in the Presidential election.
Chen, Jowei
Submitted: 2008-07-09
Keywords: distributive politics, voting, turnout, elections
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In the aftermath of the summer 2004 Florida hurricane season, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) distributed $1.2 billion in disaster aid among 2.6 million individual applications for assistance. This research measures the relative costs and benefits of using FEMA aid to buy votes from swing voters and core voters. First, I compare precinct-level vote counts and individual voter turnout records from the post-hurricane (November 2004) and pre-hurricane (2000 and 2002) elections to measure the effect of FEMA aid on Bush's vote share. Using a two-stage least squares estimator, with hurricane severity measures as instruments for FEMA aid, this analysis reveals that core Republican voters are most electorally responsive to FEMA aid -- $7,000 buys one additional vote for Bush. By contrast, in moderate precincts, each additional Bush vote costs $21,000, while voters in Democratic neighborhoods are unresponsive to receiving FEMA aid. Additionally, by tracking the geographic location of each aid recipient, the data reveal that FEMA favored applicants from Republican neighborhoods over those from Democratic or moderate neighborhoods, even conditioning on hurricane severity, average home values, and demographics. Collectively, these results demonstrate the Bush administration's disproportionate distribution of FEMA disaster aid toward core Republican areas was the optimal strategy for maximizing votes in the Presidential election.
The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
Meredith, Marc, Kessler, Daniel, Gerber, Alan
Submitted: 2008-07-21
Keywords: regression discontinuity, direct mail, persuasion, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) During the contest for Kansas attorney general in 2006, an organization sent out 6 pieces of mail criticizing the incumbent's conduct in office. We exploit a discontinuity in the rule used to select which households received the mailings to identify the causal effect of mail on vote choice and voter turnout. We find these mailings had both a statistically and politically significant effect on the challenger's vote share. Our estimates suggest that a ten percentage point increase in the amount of mail sent to a precinct increased the challenger's vote share by approximately three percentage points. Furthermore, our results suggest that the mechanism for this increase was persuasion rather than mobilization.
Meredith, Marc, Kessler, Daniel, Gerber, Alan
Submitted: 2008-07-21
Keywords: regression discontinuity, direct mail, persuasion, turnout
Abstract: (click to show/hide) During the contest for Kansas attorney general in 2006, an organization sent out 6 pieces of mail criticizing the incumbent's conduct in office. We exploit a discontinuity in the rule used to select which households received the mailings to identify the causal effect of mail on vote choice and voter turnout. We find these mailings had both a statistically and politically significant effect on the challenger's vote share. Our estimates suggest that a ten percentage point increase in the amount of mail sent to a precinct increased the challenger's vote share by approximately three percentage points. Furthermore, our results suggest that the mechanism for this increase was persuasion rather than mobilization.
Measuring the Effects of Voter Confidence on Political Participation
Levin, Ines, Alvarez, R. Michael
Submitted: 2009-06-22
Keywords: voter confidence, turnout, participation, mexico, matching, causal effects
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In this paper we study the causal effect of voter confidence on participation decisions in the 2006 Mexican Election. Previous research has shown that voter confidence was a relevant factor in explaining participation during the years of the PRI hegemony. An open question is whether this relationship is still significant after the democratic transition taking place in the years 1997-2000. Moreover, in the previous literature, this problem was studied in a regression framework. In this article we argue that, since voter confidence and participation decisions are affected by similar covariates, a regression approach may lead to results which are too model dependent, and do not account for the heterogeneity of effects across voters. To solve this problem, we use matching methods, and find that voter confidence has considerable effects on participation decisions, but substantially different in magnitude from those found using the usual regression approach.
Levin, Ines, Alvarez, R. Michael
Submitted: 2009-06-22
Keywords: voter confidence, turnout, participation, mexico, matching, causal effects
Abstract: (click to show/hide) In this paper we study the causal effect of voter confidence on participation decisions in the 2006 Mexican Election. Previous research has shown that voter confidence was a relevant factor in explaining participation during the years of the PRI hegemony. An open question is whether this relationship is still significant after the democratic transition taking place in the years 1997-2000. Moreover, in the previous literature, this problem was studied in a regression framework. In this article we argue that, since voter confidence and participation decisions are affected by similar covariates, a regression approach may lead to results which are too model dependent, and do not account for the heterogeneity of effects across voters. To solve this problem, we use matching methods, and find that voter confidence has considerable effects on participation decisions, but substantially different in magnitude from those found using the usual regression approach.
An Observational Study of Ballot Initiatives and State Outcomes
Keele, Luke
Submitted: 2009-07-17
Keywords: causal inference, matching, ballot initiatives, voter turnout, difference-in-differences
Abstract: (click to show/hide) It has long been understood that the presence of the ballot initiative process leads to different outcomes among states. In general, extant research has found that the presence of ballot initiatives tends to increase voter turnout and depress state revenues and expenditures. I reconsider this possibility and demonstrate that past findings are an artifact of incorrect research design. Failure to account for differences in states often leads to a confounding association between ballot initiatives and voter turnout and fiscal policy. Here, I conduct an observational study based on a counterfactual model of inference to analyze the effects of ballot initiatives. The resulting research design leads to two analyses. First, I utilize the synthetic case control method, which allows me to compare over time outcomes in states with initiatives to states without initiatives while accounting for pretreatment baseline differences across states. Second, I use matching to assess voter turnout differences across metro areas along state boundaries with and without ballot initiatives. In both analyses, I find that ballot initiatives rarely have spillover effects on voter turnout and state fiscal policy.
Keele, Luke
Submitted: 2009-07-17
Keywords: causal inference, matching, ballot initiatives, voter turnout, difference-in-differences
Abstract: (click to show/hide) It has long been understood that the presence of the ballot initiative process leads to different outcomes among states. In general, extant research has found that the presence of ballot initiatives tends to increase voter turnout and depress state revenues and expenditures. I reconsider this possibility and demonstrate that past findings are an artifact of incorrect research design. Failure to account for differences in states often leads to a confounding association between ballot initiatives and voter turnout and fiscal policy. Here, I conduct an observational study based on a counterfactual model of inference to analyze the effects of ballot initiatives. The resulting research design leads to two analyses. First, I utilize the synthetic case control method, which allows me to compare over time outcomes in states with initiatives to states without initiatives while accounting for pretreatment baseline differences across states. Second, I use matching to assess voter turnout differences across metro areas along state boundaries with and without ballot initiatives. In both analyses, I find that ballot initiatives rarely have spillover effects on voter turnout and state fiscal policy.
