Working Papers
1996
16 records found
The Selection Effect of International Dispute Settlement Institutions
Reinhardt, Eric
Submitted: 1996-11-11
Keywords: compliance, enforcement, dispute settlement, institution, bargaining, game theory
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper examines the impact of dispute settlement institutions on the outcome of international conflicts. Realists contend that such institutions are epiphenomenal to underlying power relationships. Neoliberals argue in contrast that institutions make cooperation more likely by clarifying obligations and reducing transaction costs. The paper introduces some puzzling evidence about the role of the dispute process under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The evidence highlights a selection effect, in which cooperation is more likely at earlier stages of institutional escalation than after the adjudication is complete. Yet why would defendants plea bargain if they know they can spurn contrary rulings? To address this question, the paper introduces an incomplete information model of international bargaining and escalation within the context of a dispute settlement institution. The model generates a number of surprising and powerful results. First, even defendants who do not fear unfavorable rulings will be more likely to plea bargain in equilibrium because of the dispute settlement institution. Second, those disputes that reach the highest levels of escalation---in which rulings are issued---are much less likely to end cooperatively than those that end before the ruling stage. The model thus explains the puzzling GATT selection effect. It also suggests that dispute settlement institutions can have a positive effect on cooperation (contra realist theory), but not through the mechanisms posited by neoliberals. In order to see the influence of such institutions, we must examine not those cases in which they issue injunctions, but rather those in which their involvement is peripheral or merely threatened.
Reinhardt, Eric
Submitted: 1996-11-11
Keywords: compliance, enforcement, dispute settlement, institution, bargaining, game theory
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper examines the impact of dispute settlement institutions on the outcome of international conflicts. Realists contend that such institutions are epiphenomenal to underlying power relationships. Neoliberals argue in contrast that institutions make cooperation more likely by clarifying obligations and reducing transaction costs. The paper introduces some puzzling evidence about the role of the dispute process under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The evidence highlights a selection effect, in which cooperation is more likely at earlier stages of institutional escalation than after the adjudication is complete. Yet why would defendants plea bargain if they know they can spurn contrary rulings? To address this question, the paper introduces an incomplete information model of international bargaining and escalation within the context of a dispute settlement institution. The model generates a number of surprising and powerful results. First, even defendants who do not fear unfavorable rulings will be more likely to plea bargain in equilibrium because of the dispute settlement institution. Second, those disputes that reach the highest levels of escalation---in which rulings are issued---are much less likely to end cooperatively than those that end before the ruling stage. The model thus explains the puzzling GATT selection effect. It also suggests that dispute settlement institutions can have a positive effect on cooperation (contra realist theory), but not through the mechanisms posited by neoliberals. In order to see the influence of such institutions, we must examine not those cases in which they issue injunctions, but rather those in which their involvement is peripheral or merely threatened.
A Bayesian Method for the Analysis of Dyadic Crisis Data
Smith, Alastair
Submitted: 1996-11-04
Keywords: Bayesian model testing, Censored data, Crisis data, Gibbs sampling, Markov chain Monte Carlo, Ordered discrete choice model, Strategic choice
Abstract: (click to show/hide) his paper examines the level of force that nations use during disputes. Suppose that two nations, A and B, are involved in a dispute. Each nation chooses the level of violence that it is prepared to use in order to achieve its objectives. Since there are two opponents making decisions, the outcome of the crisis is determined by a bivariate rather than univariate process. I propose a bivariate ordered discrete choice model to examine the relationship between nation A's decision to use force, nation B's decision to use force, and a series of explanatory variables. The model is estimated in the Bayesian context using a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation technique. I analyze Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) dyadically coded version of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Gochman and Moaz 1984). Various models are compared using Bayes Factors. The results indicate that nation A's and nation B's decisions to use force can not be regarded as independent. Bayesian model comparison show that variables derived from Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility theory (1982, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1986, 1992) provide the best explanatory variables for decision making in crises.
Smith, Alastair
Submitted: 1996-11-04
Keywords: Bayesian model testing, Censored data, Crisis data, Gibbs sampling, Markov chain Monte Carlo, Ordered discrete choice model, Strategic choice
Abstract: (click to show/hide) his paper examines the level of force that nations use during disputes. Suppose that two nations, A and B, are involved in a dispute. Each nation chooses the level of violence that it is prepared to use in order to achieve its objectives. Since there are two opponents making decisions, the outcome of the crisis is determined by a bivariate rather than univariate process. I propose a bivariate ordered discrete choice model to examine the relationship between nation A's decision to use force, nation B's decision to use force, and a series of explanatory variables. The model is estimated in the Bayesian context using a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation technique. I analyze Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) dyadically coded version of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Gochman and Moaz 1984). Various models are compared using Bayes Factors. The results indicate that nation A's and nation B's decisions to use force can not be regarded as independent. Bayesian model comparison show that variables derived from Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility theory (1982, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1986, 1992) provide the best explanatory variables for decision making in crises.
Generic Tests for a Nonlinear Model of Congressional Campaign Dynamics
Mebane, Walter R.
Submitted: 1996-08-25
Keywords: Congress, elections, campaigns, differential equations, Hopf bifurcation, non-nested hypothesis tests, Cox tests, bootstrap, nonlinear models
Abstract: (click to show/hide) I develop a statistical model based on a generic third-order Taylor series approximation for differential equation systems that exhibit Hopf bifurcation in order to use district-level cross-sectional data to test a nonlinear dynamic formal model of campaign contributions, district service and voting during and after a U.S.\ House election. The statistical model represents the key nonlinearities of the formal model's Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a highly robust fashion. For data from the years 1984--85 and 1986--87, non-nested hypothesis tests (implemented using a calibrated, parametric bootstrap method) show that under assumptions of multivariate normality, the nonlinear model is vastly superior to the generic linear alternative defined by the sample mean vector and covariance matrix.
Mebane, Walter R.
Submitted: 1996-08-25
Keywords: Congress, elections, campaigns, differential equations, Hopf bifurcation, non-nested hypothesis tests, Cox tests, bootstrap, nonlinear models
Abstract: (click to show/hide) I develop a statistical model based on a generic third-order Taylor series approximation for differential equation systems that exhibit Hopf bifurcation in order to use district-level cross-sectional data to test a nonlinear dynamic formal model of campaign contributions, district service and voting during and after a U.S.\ House election. The statistical model represents the key nonlinearities of the formal model's Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a highly robust fashion. For data from the years 1984--85 and 1986--87, non-nested hypothesis tests (implemented using a calibrated, parametric bootstrap method) show that under assumptions of multivariate normality, the nonlinear model is vastly superior to the generic linear alternative defined by the sample mean vector and covariance matrix.
Generic Tests for a Nonlinear Model of Congressional Campaign Dynamics
Mebane, Walter R.
Submitted: 1996-08-25
Keywords: Congress, elections, campaigns, differential equations, Hopf bifurcation, non-nested hypothesis tests, Cox tests, bootstrap, nonlinear models
Abstract: (click to show/hide) I develop a statistical model based on a generic third-order Taylor series approximation for differential equation systems that exhibit Hopf bifurcation in order to use district-level cross-sectional data to test a nonlinear dynamic formal model of campaign contributions, district service and voting during and after a U.S.\ House election. The statistical model represents the key nonlinearities of the formal model's Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a highly robust fashion. For data from the years 1984--85 and 1986--87, non-nested hypothesis tests (implemented using a calibrated, parametric bootstrap method) show that under assumptions of multivariate normality, the nonlinear model is vastly superior to the generic linear alternative defined by the sample mean vector and covariance matrix.
Mebane, Walter R.
Submitted: 1996-08-25
Keywords: Congress, elections, campaigns, differential equations, Hopf bifurcation, non-nested hypothesis tests, Cox tests, bootstrap, nonlinear models
Abstract: (click to show/hide) I develop a statistical model based on a generic third-order Taylor series approximation for differential equation systems that exhibit Hopf bifurcation in order to use district-level cross-sectional data to test a nonlinear dynamic formal model of campaign contributions, district service and voting during and after a U.S.\ House election. The statistical model represents the key nonlinearities of the formal model's Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a highly robust fashion. For data from the years 1984--85 and 1986--87, non-nested hypothesis tests (implemented using a calibrated, parametric bootstrap method) show that under assumptions of multivariate normality, the nonlinear model is vastly superior to the generic linear alternative defined by the sample mean vector and covariance matrix.
Politicians and the Press: Who Leads, Who Follows?
Bartels, Larry M.
Submitted: 1996-08-23
Keywords: media, agenda-setting, president, Congress, Bosnia, Medicare, NAFTA, Whitewater, VAR
Abstract: (click to show/hide) his paper examines the interplay between politicians and the press in setting the national policy agenda. The data for the analysis consist of daily counts of executive branch activities, congressional activities, New York Times stories, local newspaper stories, and ABC News coverage of Bosnia, Medicare, NAFTA, and Whitewater during the first three years of the Clinton administration. Vector autoregressions suggest that all three media outlets (and the politicians themselves) followed the lead of the executive branch on Bosnia and NAFTA and of Congress on Medicare and Whitewater. However, New York Times coverage led political activities even more than it followed them, with especially strong agenda-setting effects for NAFTA and Whitewater. The independent agenda-setting power of ABC News was substantially less than that of the Times, but still considerable, while local newspapers tended, by and large, to follow the lead of politicians and the national news media. Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1996.
Bartels, Larry M.
Submitted: 1996-08-23
Keywords: media, agenda-setting, president, Congress, Bosnia, Medicare, NAFTA, Whitewater, VAR
Abstract: (click to show/hide) his paper examines the interplay between politicians and the press in setting the national policy agenda. The data for the analysis consist of daily counts of executive branch activities, congressional activities, New York Times stories, local newspaper stories, and ABC News coverage of Bosnia, Medicare, NAFTA, and Whitewater during the first three years of the Clinton administration. Vector autoregressions suggest that all three media outlets (and the politicians themselves) followed the lead of the executive branch on Bosnia and NAFTA and of Congress on Medicare and Whitewater. However, New York Times coverage led political activities even more than it followed them, with especially strong agenda-setting effects for NAFTA and Whitewater. The independent agenda-setting power of ABC News was substantially less than that of the Times, but still considerable, while local newspapers tended, by and large, to follow the lead of politicians and the national news media. Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1996.
Partisanship and Ideology: A Subgroup Analysis Over Time
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., De Boef, Suzanna
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: partisanship, ideology, Granger causality, Haugh-Pierce tests, fractional integration
Abstract: (click to show/hide) The relationship between partisan and ideological movements in the electorate has largely gone uninvestigated (but see Box-Steffensmeier, Knight, and Sigelman 1996) We investigate the relationship between macropartisanship and macroideology over time by subgroups within the populations. We focus on particular on groups that are more or less politically sophisticated. We use CBS and New York Times survey data on partisanship and ideology. Our evidence suggests that there is a relationship between ideology and partisanship and that the more politically sophisticated the respondent, the more closely related are the series over time. Adults that answer both questions, as well as higher educated respondents, more often get ideology and partisanship "right." That is, they claim to be Democrats and liberals or Republicans and conservatives. We can reject independence more clearly as the level of education goes up as well. In addition to the increased level of political sophistication that characterizes those for whom the series are linked, these adults are more likely by wide margins, to have claimed to have voted than less sophisticated adults. Thus, any linkage has political implications. The incentives for politicans to link popular ideological sentiment with partisanship are strong. The people who put them in office (or kick them out) are the same folks who connect ideology and partisanship and who pay attention to politics.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., De Boef, Suzanna
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: partisanship, ideology, Granger causality, Haugh-Pierce tests, fractional integration
Abstract: (click to show/hide) The relationship between partisan and ideological movements in the electorate has largely gone uninvestigated (but see Box-Steffensmeier, Knight, and Sigelman 1996) We investigate the relationship between macropartisanship and macroideology over time by subgroups within the populations. We focus on particular on groups that are more or less politically sophisticated. We use CBS and New York Times survey data on partisanship and ideology. Our evidence suggests that there is a relationship between ideology and partisanship and that the more politically sophisticated the respondent, the more closely related are the series over time. Adults that answer both questions, as well as higher educated respondents, more often get ideology and partisanship "right." That is, they claim to be Democrats and liberals or Republicans and conservatives. We can reject independence more clearly as the level of education goes up as well. In addition to the increased level of political sophistication that characterizes those for whom the series are linked, these adults are more likely by wide margins, to have claimed to have voted than less sophisticated adults. Thus, any linkage has political implications. The incentives for politicans to link popular ideological sentiment with partisanship are strong. The people who put them in office (or kick them out) are the same folks who connect ideology and partisanship and who pay attention to politics.
Uncertainty and Ambivalence in the Ecology of Race
Alvarez, R. Michael, Brehm, John
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: racial policy, affirmative action, ecological inference, heteroskedastic ordered logit, value conflict, uncertainty, ambivalence, equivocation
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Since Myrdal (1944), scholars have regarded American attitudes towards racial policy as a conflict between values, groups, and interests. Although Myrdal viewed the conflict as a state internal to individuals, it begins as aggregate conflict. This mix of ecologies---individual and aggregate---carries forth to the present. This paper takes the question of different ecologies for racial politics seriously, developing tools to compare conflict at individual and aggregate level. We demonstrate that individual racial policy choices stems principally from racial resentment, and that the variability of that choice indicates a state of uncertainty, not ambivalence or equivocation. We further demonstrate that racial resentment does not surface as a predictor of aggregate racial policy choice, even though individual choices about racial policies appear to be more strongly influenced by the level of political informedness.
Alvarez, R. Michael, Brehm, John
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: racial policy, affirmative action, ecological inference, heteroskedastic ordered logit, value conflict, uncertainty, ambivalence, equivocation
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Since Myrdal (1944), scholars have regarded American attitudes towards racial policy as a conflict between values, groups, and interests. Although Myrdal viewed the conflict as a state internal to individuals, it begins as aggregate conflict. This mix of ecologies---individual and aggregate---carries forth to the present. This paper takes the question of different ecologies for racial politics seriously, developing tools to compare conflict at individual and aggregate level. We demonstrate that individual racial policy choices stems principally from racial resentment, and that the variability of that choice indicates a state of uncertainty, not ambivalence or equivocation. We further demonstrate that racial resentment does not surface as a predictor of aggregate racial policy choice, even though individual choices about racial policies appear to be more strongly influenced by the level of political informedness.
Explaining the Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992
Chaney, Carole, Alvarez, R. Michael, Nagler, Jonathan
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: presidential elections, gender gap, issue voting, economic evaluations, general-extreme value model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper compares the voting behavior of women and men in presidential elections since 1980 to test competing explanations for the gender gap. We show that, consistent with prior research on individual elections, women placed more emphasis on the national economy than men, and men placed more emphasis on pocketbook voting than women. We add evidence showing that women have consistently more negative assessments of the economy than do men, suggesting that a part of what has been considered a Republican-Democratic gender gap is really an anti-incumbent bias on the part of women. Our multivariate analysis demonstrates that neither the differences between men and women's preferences nor emphasis on any single issue explains the significant gender gap in vote choice; but that a combination of respondent views on the economy, social programs, military action, abortion, and ideology can consistently explain at least three-fourths of the gender gap in the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections. We also clarify the interpretation of partisan identification in explaining the gender gap.
Chaney, Carole, Alvarez, R. Michael, Nagler, Jonathan
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: presidential elections, gender gap, issue voting, economic evaluations, general-extreme value model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper compares the voting behavior of women and men in presidential elections since 1980 to test competing explanations for the gender gap. We show that, consistent with prior research on individual elections, women placed more emphasis on the national economy than men, and men placed more emphasis on pocketbook voting than women. We add evidence showing that women have consistently more negative assessments of the economy than do men, suggesting that a part of what has been considered a Republican-Democratic gender gap is really an anti-incumbent bias on the part of women. Our multivariate analysis demonstrates that neither the differences between men and women's preferences nor emphasis on any single issue explains the significant gender gap in vote choice; but that a combination of respondent views on the economy, social programs, military action, abortion, and ideology can consistently explain at least three-fourths of the gender gap in the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections. We also clarify the interpretation of partisan identification in explaining the gender gap.
Modelling Space and Time: The Event History Approach
Beck, Nathaniel
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: duration analysis, event history analysis, time-series--cross-section data, discrete duration data, duration dependence
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This is an elementary exposition of duration modelling prepared for a volume in celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Essex Summer School (Research Strategies in the Social Sciences, Elinor Scarbrough and Eric Tanenbaum, editors). The approach is non-mathematical. The running example used is the King et al. model of cabinet durations with particular attention paid to detecting and interpreting duration dependence in that model. There is some new discussion of ascertaining duration dependence using discrete methods and the relationship between discrete duration data and binary time-series--cross-section data.
Beck, Nathaniel
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: duration analysis, event history analysis, time-series--cross-section data, discrete duration data, duration dependence
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This is an elementary exposition of duration modelling prepared for a volume in celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Essex Summer School (Research Strategies in the Social Sciences, Elinor Scarbrough and Eric Tanenbaum, editors). The approach is non-mathematical. The running example used is the King et al. model of cabinet durations with particular attention paid to detecting and interpreting duration dependence in that model. There is some new discussion of ascertaining duration dependence using discrete methods and the relationship between discrete duration data and binary time-series--cross-section data.
Using Cluster Analysis to Derive Early Warning Indicators for Political Change in the Middle East, 1979-1996
Schrodt, Philip A., Gerner, Deborah J.
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: event data, conflict, early warning, Middle East, cluster analysis, genetic algorithms
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper uses event data to develop an early warning model of major political changes in the Levant for the period April 1979 to July 1996. Following a general review of statistical early warning research, the analysis focuses on the behavior of eight Middle Eastern actorsÑEgypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, Syria, the United States and USSR/RussiaÑusing WEIS-coded event data generated from Reuters news service lead sentences with the KEDS machine-coding system. The analysis extends earlier work (Schrodt and Gerner 1995) demonstrating that clusters of behavior identified by conventional statistical methods correspond well with changes in political behavior identified a priori. We employ a new clustering algorithm that uses the correlation between the dyadic behaviors at two points in time as a measure of distance, and identifies cluster breaks as those time points that are closer to later points than to preceding points. We also demonstrate that these data clusters begin to "stretch" prior to breaking apart; this characteristic is used as an early-warning indicator. A Monte- Carlo analysis shows that the clustering and early warning measures perform very differently in simulated data sets having the same mean, variance, and autocorrelation as the observed data (but no cross-correlation) which reduces the likelihood that the clustering patterns are due to chance. The initial analysis uses Goldstein's (1992) weighting system to aggregate the WEIS-coded data. In an attempt to improve on the Goldstein scale, we use a genetic algorithm to optimize the weighting of the WEIS event categories for the purpose of clustering. This does not prove very successful and only differentiates clusters in the first half of the data set, a result similar to one we obtained using the cross-sectional K- Means clustering procedure. Correlating the frequency of events in the twenty-two 2-digit WEIS categories, on the other hand, gives clustering and early warning results similar to those produced by the Goldstein scale. The paper concludes with some general remarks on the role of quantitative early warning and directions for further research. This paper was presented at the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 28 August - 1 September 1996
Schrodt, Philip A., Gerner, Deborah J.
Submitted: 1996-08-22
Keywords: event data, conflict, early warning, Middle East, cluster analysis, genetic algorithms
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper uses event data to develop an early warning model of major political changes in the Levant for the period April 1979 to July 1996. Following a general review of statistical early warning research, the analysis focuses on the behavior of eight Middle Eastern actorsÑEgypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, Syria, the United States and USSR/RussiaÑusing WEIS-coded event data generated from Reuters news service lead sentences with the KEDS machine-coding system. The analysis extends earlier work (Schrodt and Gerner 1995) demonstrating that clusters of behavior identified by conventional statistical methods correspond well with changes in political behavior identified a priori. We employ a new clustering algorithm that uses the correlation between the dyadic behaviors at two points in time as a measure of distance, and identifies cluster breaks as those time points that are closer to later points than to preceding points. We also demonstrate that these data clusters begin to "stretch" prior to breaking apart; this characteristic is used as an early-warning indicator. A Monte- Carlo analysis shows that the clustering and early warning measures perform very differently in simulated data sets having the same mean, variance, and autocorrelation as the observed data (but no cross-correlation) which reduces the likelihood that the clustering patterns are due to chance. The initial analysis uses Goldstein's (1992) weighting system to aggregate the WEIS-coded data. In an attempt to improve on the Goldstein scale, we use a genetic algorithm to optimize the weighting of the WEIS event categories for the purpose of clustering. This does not prove very successful and only differentiates clusters in the first half of the data set, a result similar to one we obtained using the cross-sectional K- Means clustering procedure. Correlating the frequency of events in the twenty-two 2-digit WEIS categories, on the other hand, gives clustering and early warning results similar to those produced by the Goldstein scale. The paper concludes with some general remarks on the role of quantitative early warning and directions for further research. This paper was presented at the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 28 August - 1 September 1996
Bootstrap Methods for Non-nested Hypothesis Tests
Mebane, Walter R., Sekhon, Jasjeet
Submitted: 1996-07-20
Keywords: Cox Test, Bootstrap, LISREL, Endogenous Switching Regression, Tobit-Style Censoring
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Cox (1961; 1962) proposed a fairly general method that can be used to construct powerful tests of alternative hypotheses from separate statistical families. We prove that non-parametric bootstrap methods can produce consistent and second-order correct approximations to the distribution of the Cox statistic for non-nested LISREL-style covariance structure models. We use the method to investigate a question about the specification of a LISREL model used by Kinder, Adams and Gronke (1989). In a second application---a pair of non-nested endogenous switching regression models with tobit-style censoring, applied to real data---we illustrate how bootstrap calibration can be used to correct the size of the test when the test distribution is being estimated by Monte Carlo simulation due to concern about nonregularity.
Mebane, Walter R., Sekhon, Jasjeet
Submitted: 1996-07-20
Keywords: Cox Test, Bootstrap, LISREL, Endogenous Switching Regression, Tobit-Style Censoring
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Cox (1961; 1962) proposed a fairly general method that can be used to construct powerful tests of alternative hypotheses from separate statistical families. We prove that non-parametric bootstrap methods can produce consistent and second-order correct approximations to the distribution of the Cox statistic for non-nested LISREL-style covariance structure models. We use the method to investigate a question about the specification of a LISREL model used by Kinder, Adams and Gronke (1989). In a second application---a pair of non-nested endogenous switching regression models with tobit-style censoring, applied to real data---we illustrate how bootstrap calibration can be used to correct the size of the test when the test distribution is being estimated by Monte Carlo simulation due to concern about nonregularity.
Costly Information and the Stability of Equilibria in the Intergenerational Dilemma
Signorino, Curtis S.
Submitted: 1996-07-16
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, overlapping generations model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Past analyses of the intergenerational dilemma have identified a number of subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. However, nothing has been said about the stability of these equilibria: how robust they are to perturbation or how difficult it is to move to a Pareto-improving equilibrium. Moreover, it is generally assumed that information is costless. In this paper, I incorporate costly information and analyze the stability of the equilibria, identifying (1) the conditions under which CONFORMIST versus DEFECTOR equilibria will be stable and (2) the degree of difficulty in moving from the Pareto-suboptimal DEFECTOR equilibrium to the Pareto-optimal CONFORMIST equilibrium. In general, the maintenance of a CONFORMIST equilibrium becomes more difficult the more the second period is discounted and the higher the information costs. Additionally, when altruists are included in the model and information is only slightly costly, cycling among the homogeneous equilibria can occur. I show that to counter this instability, conformists should always punish altruists --- that to protect one's own future payoffs, one may need to police the interactions of others.
Signorino, Curtis S.
Submitted: 1996-07-16
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, overlapping generations model
Abstract: (click to show/hide) Past analyses of the intergenerational dilemma have identified a number of subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. However, nothing has been said about the stability of these equilibria: how robust they are to perturbation or how difficult it is to move to a Pareto-improving equilibrium. Moreover, it is generally assumed that information is costless. In this paper, I incorporate costly information and analyze the stability of the equilibria, identifying (1) the conditions under which CONFORMIST versus DEFECTOR equilibria will be stable and (2) the degree of difficulty in moving from the Pareto-suboptimal DEFECTOR equilibrium to the Pareto-optimal CONFORMIST equilibrium. In general, the maintenance of a CONFORMIST equilibrium becomes more difficult the more the second period is discounted and the higher the information costs. Additionally, when altruists are included in the model and information is only slightly costly, cycling among the homogeneous equilibria can occur. I show that to counter this instability, conformists should always punish altruists --- that to protect one's own future payoffs, one may need to police the interactions of others.
Polarization and Political Violence
Penubarti, Mohan, Asea, Patrick
Submitted: 1996-07-12
Keywords: polarization, political violence, extreme bounds analysis
Abstract: (click to show/hide) We explore the implications of a new notion of inequality --- polarization --- for the incidence and level of political violence. A society is said to be polarized when its members can be classified into different clusters, with each cluster being similar in terms of the attributes of its members (intra--group homogeneity) but with different clusters having members with dissimilar attributes (inter--group heterogeneity). The notion of polarization provides an important conceptual breakthrough in understanding inequality in societies because a society may be facing a decrease (increase) in inequality while at the same time experiencing an increase (decrease) in polarization. We conduct empirical analysis on a large sample of countries to demonstrate the positive link between polarization and political violence. In contrast, traditional measures of inequality perform poorly with the introduction of polarization in the model specification. Additionally, we conduct global sensitivity analysis to explore the robustness of the polarization measure to reasonable changes in the conditioning information set.
Penubarti, Mohan, Asea, Patrick
Submitted: 1996-07-12
Keywords: polarization, political violence, extreme bounds analysis
Abstract: (click to show/hide) We explore the implications of a new notion of inequality --- polarization --- for the incidence and level of political violence. A society is said to be polarized when its members can be classified into different clusters, with each cluster being similar in terms of the attributes of its members (intra--group homogeneity) but with different clusters having members with dissimilar attributes (inter--group heterogeneity). The notion of polarization provides an important conceptual breakthrough in understanding inequality in societies because a society may be facing a decrease (increase) in inequality while at the same time experiencing an increase (decrease) in polarization. We conduct empirical analysis on a large sample of countries to demonstrate the positive link between polarization and political violence. In contrast, traditional measures of inequality perform poorly with the introduction of polarization in the model specification. Additionally, we conduct global sensitivity analysis to explore the robustness of the polarization measure to reasonable changes in the conditioning information set.
Macropartisanship: A Replication and Critique
Palmquist, Bradley, Green, Donald P., Schickler, Eric
Submitted: 1996-07-11
Keywords: partisanship, macropartisanship, presidential approval, time series
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper reevaluates the thesis of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1992) that aggregate party identification balance (macropartisanship) shifts significantly over short periods of time in response to changes in presidential popularity and consumer sentiment. The data originally used by MacKuen, et al. were a sample of the complete set of Gallup polls available from 1953 to 1988. Because their data are no longer extant, and to make use of more information, we analyze party id data from 677 personal and 305 telephone Gallup polls, aggregated quarterly from 1953 to 1995. Comparisons are also made with analyses from CBS/New York Times data. As well as attempting to replicate the MacKuen, et al. results (an attempt which is not entirely successful, perhaps because of the data differences), we develop a more flexible and parsimonious time series model linking approval, consumer sentiment, and macropartisanship. The estimates obtained lead to the conclusion that macropartisanship adjusts to short-term shocks in a limited and gradual fashion. These shifts are not large enough to call into question the traditional views of realignment and the stabilizing role that party identification plays in a party system.
Palmquist, Bradley, Green, Donald P., Schickler, Eric
Submitted: 1996-07-11
Keywords: partisanship, macropartisanship, presidential approval, time series
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper reevaluates the thesis of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1992) that aggregate party identification balance (macropartisanship) shifts significantly over short periods of time in response to changes in presidential popularity and consumer sentiment. The data originally used by MacKuen, et al. were a sample of the complete set of Gallup polls available from 1953 to 1988. Because their data are no longer extant, and to make use of more information, we analyze party id data from 677 personal and 305 telephone Gallup polls, aggregated quarterly from 1953 to 1995. Comparisons are also made with analyses from CBS/New York Times data. As well as attempting to replicate the MacKuen, et al. results (an attempt which is not entirely successful, perhaps because of the data differences), we develop a more flexible and parsimonious time series model linking approval, consumer sentiment, and macropartisanship. The estimates obtained lead to the conclusion that macropartisanship adjusts to short-term shocks in a limited and gradual fashion. These shifts are not large enough to call into question the traditional views of realignment and the stabilizing role that party identification plays in a party system.
Senate Voting on NAFTA: The Power and Limitations of MCMC Methods for Studying Voting across Bills and across States
Smith, Alastair, McGillivray, Fiona
Submitted: 1996-07-09
Keywords: NAFTA, MCMC, Gibbs sampling, bivariate probit, Senate
Abstract: (click to show/hide) We examine similarities in senate voting within states and across two senate bills: the 1991 fast track authorization bill and the 1993 NAFTA implementation bill. A series of bivariate probit models are estimated by Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. We discuss the power of MCMC techniques and how the output of these sampling procedures can be used for Bayesian model comparisons. Having separately explored the similarities in votes across bills and within states, we develop a 4-variate probit model to explain voting on NAFTA. The power of MCMC techniques to estimate this complicated model is demonstrated with two different MCMC procedures. We conclude by discussing the data requirements for these techniques.
Smith, Alastair, McGillivray, Fiona
Submitted: 1996-07-09
Keywords: NAFTA, MCMC, Gibbs sampling, bivariate probit, Senate
Abstract: (click to show/hide) We examine similarities in senate voting within states and across two senate bills: the 1991 fast track authorization bill and the 1993 NAFTA implementation bill. A series of bivariate probit models are estimated by Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. We discuss the power of MCMC techniques and how the output of these sampling procedures can be used for Bayesian model comparisons. Having separately explored the similarities in votes across bills and within states, we develop a 4-variate probit model to explain voting on NAFTA. The power of MCMC techniques to estimate this complicated model is demonstrated with two different MCMC procedures. We conclude by discussing the data requirements for these techniques.
Methodology for Estimating the Impact of Partisan Competition on the Economy
Herron, Michael C.
Submitted: 1996-07-08
Keywords: political economy, United Kingdom, derivative security
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper develops and applies a methodology designed to pinpoint the relation between government partisanship and national--level economic variables. In particular, we consider the British polity since the early 1980s and estimate the economic impact of the Conservative Party's dominance of government since 1983. Furthermore, we consider the counterfactual problem of assessing the economic consequences of a Labour win in any of the three most recent British elections. The analysis conducted in the paper creates snapshots of government partisanship effects at each national election. Thus, the paper is able not only to determine if changes in the partisan nature of British government were reflected in economic variables but also is able to consider how the relation between the partisanship of the British government and the British economy has varied over time. The ability to allow for time--based fluctuations in this relation represents an advance within the existing empirical literature on the subject of government partisanship effects. Indeed, contemporary empirical research on government partisanship and its economic consequences is entirely silent on the possibility of temporal variation in the relation between the two. The methodology employed in this paper is based on election campaign--period movements of prices of publicly--traded financial and equity derivative securities. The dataset of such securities is exceedingly rich; compared to the extant literature on government partisanship and economics, the dataset in conjunction with the models developed here allow for greater precision in estimating the impact of partisan changes in government. Overall, the tools presented augment the scholarly understanding of the implications of government partisanship.
Herron, Michael C.
Submitted: 1996-07-08
Keywords: political economy, United Kingdom, derivative security
Abstract: (click to show/hide) This paper develops and applies a methodology designed to pinpoint the relation between government partisanship and national--level economic variables. In particular, we consider the British polity since the early 1980s and estimate the economic impact of the Conservative Party's dominance of government since 1983. Furthermore, we consider the counterfactual problem of assessing the economic consequences of a Labour win in any of the three most recent British elections. The analysis conducted in the paper creates snapshots of government partisanship effects at each national election. Thus, the paper is able not only to determine if changes in the partisan nature of British government were reflected in economic variables but also is able to consider how the relation between the partisanship of the British government and the British economy has varied over time. The ability to allow for time--based fluctuations in this relation represents an advance within the existing empirical literature on the subject of government partisanship effects. Indeed, contemporary empirical research on government partisanship and its economic consequences is entirely silent on the possibility of temporal variation in the relation between the two. The methodology employed in this paper is based on election campaign--period movements of prices of publicly--traded financial and equity derivative securities. The dataset of such securities is exceedingly rich; compared to the extant literature on government partisanship and economics, the dataset in conjunction with the models developed here allow for greater precision in estimating the impact of partisan changes in government. Overall, the tools presented augment the scholarly understanding of the implications of government partisanship.
