

Using IRT to Estimate Ideology in Congress

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Abstract

I use item response theory (IRT) to estimate latent ideology from selected roll-call votes in the first session of the 110th House of Representatives. Votes are selected if they are divisive, unique, but not wholly explained by party loyalties. The method is similar to the one employed by Clinton et al (2004), but does not assume a spatial structure of voting. The results demonstrate that (1) although Democrats hold a majority of the seats in the 110th House, a majority of the members have conservative ideologies, (2) the Republican party leadership is much more conservative than the Democratic party leadership is liberal, and (3) that the House is far less ideologically polarized than DW-Nominate scores would indicate.

The measurement of ideology in Congress is both important for political science, and difficult. Measuring ideology is important because ideology has been used as an important independent variable in many theoretical research areas involving Congress. Measuring ideology is difficult because ideology is unobserved. We cannot take politicians' words that they are as liberal, conservative, or as moderate as they say they are (or aren't!). Ideology is therefore a latent variable; even though we cannot observe ideology we still have some innovative empirical techniques to measure unobserved variables. It makes sense, therefore, that the task of measuring ideology has captured the attention of Congressional scholars and political methodologists.

In this paper, I describe how item response theory (IRT), a method to measure an unobserved, latent variable such as Congressional ideology, may be an improvement over current methodologies. I then show how the application of this method yields immediate results which can affect the way we understand polarization in Congress.

Background

Congressional scholarship and the measurement of Congressional ideology.

Even though ideology is unobserved, many important areas of Congressional scholarship have treated ideology as a quantifiable variable. In this section I briefly discuss the role of ideology in the study of representation, roll-call

voting behavior, and polarization.

Studies of representation have focused on the question of how responsive a representative has to be to his or her district. Specifically, one idea of representation would hold that representatives should vote in accordance with the ideological preferences of their constituents. David R. Mayhew (1974) developed the idea of the “electoral connection,” which posits that Congressmen are singularly interested in being reelected and early studies have shown that Congressmen try to appeal to their constituents (Fenno 1978). Some researchers have focused on how representatives try to bring direct benefits, such as public works projects, to their districts (Fiorina 1989, Arnold 1990). However, representatives also have to appeal to their constituents ideologically on national issues (Canes-Wrone et al 2002). In fact, these national issues have become more and more important recently (Jacobson 1989).

Second, the study of the voting behavior of representatives depends crucially on a quantifiable measurement of ideology. The first formal models of voting typically involved single-peaked graphs of utility with ideology represented as the X-axis (Hotelling 1929, Black 1948, Downs 1957).

Third, a more recent stream of research has analyzed an increase in political polarization both in Congress and in the electorate. Ideology is thought to be well-ordered and one-dimensional, with positions ranging from liberal to conservative. Polarization refers to movement along this dimension: Congressmen and constituents are flocking towards the poles. But the very setup of this puzzle assumes a quantifiable measurement of ideology. Much of the empirical evidence of polarization focuses on the divergence of the two political parties (Roberts and Smith 2003, Brady and Han 2004, Ansolabehere et al 2001). But if polarization is spurred because of party pressures, then ideology might not explain polarization at all; rather party loyalty and other party induced pressures create polarization. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997) find that Congressional ideology is often indistinguishable from party loyalty. Morris P. Fiorina (2005) argues, however, that the public only appears polarized due to the influence of the parties. Likewise, it may be the case that representatives only appear ideologically polarized because of the influence of the parties. Current methodologies to measure ideology seem to be unable to distinguish ideology from party loyalty. An interesting puzzle remains: independent of party influences, are representatives still ideologically polarized?

Methodological developments in measuring Congressional ideology.

Accurate measurement is crucial for an empirical understanding of the effect of Congressional ideology. Measurement error can introduce severe bias into linear models. Therefore, an empirical model that includes ideology as a right-hand side variable is only as accurate as the measurement technique used to measure ideology.

Other methods.

Researchers have typically employed proxies to account for latent variables such as ideology. Unfortunately, there do not seem to be many observable substitutes for ideology which are at all satisfying. It is doubtful that many Congressmen would agree to take a survey with carefully worded items to identify latent ideology, and even with a large sample the responses of these elected officials somehow do not seem all that credible. A better indication of ideology is the Congressional roll-call voting record. If we can assume that ideology explains how representatives make their voting decisions, then the voting record is a strong proxy for ideology. Congressmen provide a great deal of data and have (arguably?) little incentive to depart from their ideological preferences when voting. The question is then how to best derive a sufficient statistic from these data. For years political scientists relied upon the indices of Congressional ideology provided by interest groups. Although some research makes a strong argument for how these measures can be useful (Levitt 1996, Groseclose et al 1999), it still seems fundamentally problematic to depend on a measurement provided by groups with clear, unabashed political agendas. Furthermore, many of these indices simply added up the number of votes that were “liberal” or “conservative” (Clinton et al 2004a). Clearly, however, some votes should be more indicative of liberal or conservative preferences than others.

More promising measurement techniques have come from quantitative psychology. Factor analysis and principle components analysis are ways to place weights on a set of variables that are jointly explained by a latent trait. If we treat every vote in Congress as a separate variable, then a factor analysis can consider the proportion of the variance of each variable that coincides with the shared variance of all the variables, and in that way derive weights to create a better index for ideology. Factor analysis and principle components

analysis are also robust methods to calculate multiple dimensions of a latent trait. Unfortunately, votes in Congress are binary variables, and calculation of shared variance becomes problematic¹.

Political science owes a great debt to Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal who first developed a statistical measurement of ideology in Congress from the roll-call voting record (1991, 1997). Their method, called *Nominate*, is based on the spatial model of voting, which postulates that Congressmen have an ideal point in an ideological space. Each bill also has a position in this space. This position becomes the new position of public policy if the bill passes, and the position remains at the status quo if the bill fails. Therefore a representative chooses between two points in ideological space by choosing between the “yay” and “nay” votes on the bill. The spatial model of voting assumes that Congressmen choose the option that is closest to their ideal point.

Joshua D. Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers (2004b) propose an alternative method to measure ideology. They claim that “any method of ideal point estimation embodies an explicit or implicit model of legislative behavior,” but they criticize *Nominate* for using “ideal points estimated under one set of assumptions . . . to test a different behavioral model” (p. 355). Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (henceforth *CJR*) use a formulation of IRT called “unfolding” which I describe in the next section. I believe that there is a difficulty which may be producing bias in *CJR*’s estimates, and I also discuss this potential bias in the next section. *CJR*’s ideal point estimates for the 106th House are highly correlated with the *Nominate* scores for the same representatives.

One major criticism of *CJR* and similar work is that the results do not depart from *Nominate* enough to warrant a shift in the preferences of the field from the tried and true method. I argue, however, that improving on existing methodologies is beneficial regardless of the departure (or lack thereof) from previous results. Better methods may provide more accurate results in the future. Also, for latent measurement we should be particularly vigilant with our methods because latent independent variables are especially sensitive to measurement error. Finally, better methods are simply more elegant, independent of results. Although *Nominate* has provided more guidance

¹Heckman and Snyder (1997) use a factor analytic technique on linear probabilities derived from these binary roll-call votes to estimate ideology, though I do not discuss their methodology here.

to researchers than any other measurement, we should not be content to continue using this method. CJR's criticisms of Nominate are valid, and problems occur when the measurement technique assumes too much of a decision structure. I propose a method, using item response theory (IRT), which does not assume a spatial model of voting.

Item Response Theory.

IRT was developed by teachers to help analyze students' test results². Each question- called an *item*- on the exam can be coded in a binary way: each item is either correct or incorrect. The idea is that a student's response on each item, whether correct or not, depends on the underlying dimension of ability. Students can be graded by adding up the number of correct responses, but that method does not account for the variation in difficulty between items. If two students correctly answered 7 items out of 10, then they receive the same sum-score. However, suppose the last three items were the three most difficult questions, and that the first student gave correct responses to these three items while the second student missed all three. We have evidence that the first student has a greater ability level than the second student despite their equal grades. Item response theory takes this evidence into account in estimating the latent ability of test-takers.

In terms of grading, it is understandably controversial to assign different grades to students with the same overall sum-score on a test, but there is nothing controversial about estimating Congressional ideology in this way. The analogy is simple. The test-takers are representatives and the test consists of the roll-call votes. A "correct" response is a conservative vote³. Instead of estimating latent ability we are estimating latent ideology.

In this paper, I am estimating a two-parameter logistic (2-PL) item response model. In a 2-PL model, the probability of a correct response is considered for every item, distributed logistically with two parameters. For every item, a logistic "trace line" can be drawn that relates the parameters

²For a detailed explanation of IRT, including some history of the method and the binary choice, multiple choice, graded, and multidimensional versions of IRT, see van der Linden and Hambleton (1997). Most of the discussion in this section draws from class notes from Dr. David Thissen, Psychology 859, Spring 2008, UNC Chapel Hill.

³The choice to code a conservative vote as "correct" is completely arbitrary. Either liberal or conservative needs to be coded as a correct response. The estimation will work in entirely the same way if we coded liberal as correct instead.

to the probability of a correct response. The trace line for roll-call vote 87, an amendment to H.R. 547, is drawn in figure 1. Symbolically, the formula




Figure 1: Probability of a Conservative Vote on the Amendment to H.R. 547, by Ideology

for the trace line is

$$P(u_{i,j} = 1|\theta) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-a_j(\theta_i - b_j)}}, \quad (1)$$

where $u_{i,j}$ is the response of representative i on roll-call vote j . $u_{i,j} = 0$ if representative i voted in the liberal direction on vote j , and $u_{i,j} = 1$ if representative i voted in the conservative direction on vote j . I discuss the specifics of how the roll-call data are managed for this model in the data section. θ is the latent trait to be estimated, which in our case is Congressional ideology. a_j is the slope parameter for item j : as a increases, the graph moves from low probabilities to high probabilities more quickly; the slope in the middle of the curve increases. b_j is the threshold parameter, which indicates the value of θ at which a test-taker has a .5 probability

of responding to the item correctly. As b increases, fewer test-takers will respond to the item correctly.

Substantively, high values of the slope parameter indicate that an item discriminates very well between test-takers that fall above and below the threshold b . If a is high enough, test-takers just to the left of the threshold will still have a very low probability of a correct response, and test-takers just to the right of the threshold have a very high probability of a correct response. a and b are sometimes called the *discrimination* and *difficulty* of an item. For Congress, votes with low values of b are ones in which most representatives are inclined to vote conservatively, and votes with high values of b are ones in which most are inclined to vote liberally. Votes with high values of a are the ones that were most homogenously divided along ideological lines. For the votes that were actually used in the analysis, the a and b parameters are reported in the appendix in table 3.

Standard maximum likelihood would maximize a likelihood function of the form

$$L(\theta, a, b|u) = \prod_{i=1}^M \prod_{j=1}^N P(u_{i,j} = 1|\theta_j), \quad (2)$$

where θ is the vector of ideology estimates for M representatives, and a and b are vectors of the slope and threshold parameters for the N votes. In fact, for N votes and M representatives, there are $N + 2M$ parameters to estimate for the 2-PL model. The problem with standard maximum likelihood estimation is that there is no scale for the latent trait θ . Consider a quiz with 10 questions on it. If a student answers all 10 questions correctly, then the ML estimate for the ability of that student is ∞ .

In order to impose a scale on the latent variable, parameters are estimated using marginal maximum likelihood estimation in which a prior distribution is imposed on θ (Thissen and Wainer 2001, p.77)⁴. The prior distribution is usually just a standard normal distribution. Likewise, I use a standard normal prior on Congressional ideology. The maximum marginal likelihood function for the 2-PL model is

$$L(\theta, a, b|u) = \left(\prod_{i=1}^M \prod_{j=1}^N P(u_{i,j} = 1|\theta_j) \right) \phi(\theta). \quad (3)$$

⁴The use of a prior distribution may qualify IRT as a “Bayesian” method. However, the philosophy behind imposing a prior is not a Bayesian one. The prior is included strictly to help the parameter estimates converge.

Given the data (the roll-call votes), a posterior probability distribution is derived for the value of θ for each representative. The reported estimates of latent Congressional ideology in this paper are the marginal *a priori* (MAP) estimates of θ : the modal values of these posterior distributions (Thissen and Wainer 2001, p.110).

Comparison to CJR.

In “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data,” CJR also use item response theory to estimate Congressional ideal points. Their formulation of IRT is somewhat different from mine, however. They use trace lines which are normal PDFs rather than logistic CDFs. In other words, they allow voters that are too far to the left and too far to the right of a proposal to vote “nay.” Each line still has two parameters, except the interpretation of the parameters changes. Rather than a slope and a threshold, they estimate a mean and a variance for the “yay” positions of each bill. The mean is the position in ideological space of the bill, and the variance describes the falloff in the probability of a “yay” vote as a representative’s ideal point moves away (in either direction) from the position of the bill. This formulation is known in the psychometric literature as an “unfolding” IRT model (Roberts et al 2000). Other than the bell-curve construction of the trace lines, the unfolding model is structurally equivalent to mine.

CJR’s model has one notable advantage over mine, but there are also two areas in which I believe my model improves upon their work. CJR’s advantage is that the unfolding model allows for strategic voting. For whatever reason, it is conceivable that a representative might vote against a bill that he or she prefers to the status quo, and with greater likelihood as distance increases. Consider a bill that is placed moderately on the conservative side of a single ideological dimension and a representative that is very conservative on that dimension. Under my model the conservative representative will vote for the bill with greater certainty as his or her ideological position becomes even more conservative. Under the unfolding model, the probability that representative votes “yay” decreases as distance from the bill increases in the conservative direction.

The unfolding model, like Nominate, assumes that the spatial model of voting holds for Congressional roll-call voting behavior. This model may not actually hold, and we should not test the validity of the model with a measure that assumes it. Standard IRT does not assume any structure to

the preferences of the test-takers. We do not even assume that each test-taker *prefers* to answer a question correctly, we only care whether they do or do not answer correctly. Likewise, the 2-PL model does not care why a representative chooses to vote “yay” or “nay” or in liberal or conservative directions. I do assume the standard normal prior distribution of ideology, however. I also make another assumption which I point out in the data section.

More seriously, CJR formulate a model that assumes “independence across roll-calls and legislators” (p. 356). Independence across legislators may or may not be a problematic assumption, depending on the amount of party whipping and vote trading between legislators. However, I find the assumption of independence across roll-calls to be more troubling. The assumption implies that the decision of a legislator on a vote does not depend on their decision on any other vote. For starters, some votes in the House are the exact same as a previous vote, such as veto override votes. It may also be the case that, conditional on ideology, votes remain correlated if they are on the same day, or on the same bill, or near an election, or on an particular issue such as war funding. There may be many ways in which the roll-call votes are locally dependent. If either of the above assumptions are violated, then the likelihood function is incorrectly specified, and item parameters as well as the latent trait estimates are biased and inconsistent.

Psychometricians have observed this problem of local dependence of items, and have developed a correction. Locally dependent items can be grouped into larger groups called “testlets” (Wainer et al 2007, p.52-53). Only one set of item parameters are estimated for each testlet, which reduces the number of item parameters to be estimated, but does not reduce the number of latent estimates. If the testlets are independent from each other, then estimates are consistent. The trick then is to group all correlated items together in testlets so that the testlets are independent. One technique is to group similar items by hand. That can be a mighty task, however, since there were 1186 roll-call votes during the first session of the 110th House of Representatives alone. There are some ways to infer local dependence from the data: correlation among item residuals after IRT estimation without testlets is one indication of local dependence; very high slope parameters are also indicative of locally dependent items (Thissen and Wainer 2001, p. 175). Ruth Mathiowetz (2008) has recently developed software to search for local dependence among items and create testlets.

In this paper, I do not create testlets to correct for local dependence.

However, I do run some basic diagnostics and I delete items which appear to violate the assumption of independence. I analyze fewer votes in this paper than CJR, but I am more confident that my items are independent conditional on ideology, and that my estimates of latent ideology are consistent. I hope to do an extended, testlet-based analysis of the roll-call data in the near future.

Data

For this project I used the roll-call voting record for the first session of the 110th House of Representatives, which occurred during the calendar year 2007. I fit the data to a 2-PL IRT model, with a standard normal prior distribution of ideology. I calculated MAP scores for latent ideology for the 438 representatives in the House at the time. These scores can be interpreted as standard deviations away from the hypothesized prior mean of ideology in the House, set at 0. The information curve in figure 2 relates the Fisher information from the model, which depends on the value of the estimated latent trait. The information curve is very high in the middle of the posterior distribution of θ , which indicates that the 2-PL model fits the data well (van der Linden and Hambleton 1997, p. 13-14).

The roll-call votes are made available publicly as “yay” or “nay” votes. I wanted, however, to recode these votes as liberal and conservative. As I stated above, the 2-PL IRT model does not assume a spatial structure of voting. But I did make the following assumption:

<p>Assumption: The majority of Democrats will never be more conservative than the majority of Republicans on any roll-call vote.</p>

This assumption allows me to set a baseline against which I can convert the “yay” and “nay” votes to liberal and conservative responses. If, on a vote, the majority of Democrats and the majority of Republicans disagree, then I assume that the Democrats are not more conservative than the Republicans, so they must be more liberal. I drop from the analysis all items for which the majority of Democrats and Republicans agree. Typically, for these items there is little variation, and whatever variation does exist is not likely to have been caused by ideology. After dropping these votes, a liberal vote is one that agrees with the majority of Democrats, and a conservative




Figure 2: Information by Ideology

vote is one that agrees with the majority of Republicans.

For IRT, it is not necessary to use all of the roll-call votes in order to derive a consistent estimate of ideology, so long as a sample is used which will not bias the results. In order to help estimation, I also dropped items for which:

1. the vote was exactly identical to another vote in the dataset,
2. fewer than 5 Democrats or fewer than 5 Republicans voted against the majority of their party,
3. the slope parameter in initial runs of IRT was greater than 5, indicating local dependence.

Conditions 2 and 3 narrowed down the dataset quite a bit. I was left with 66 items out of the original 1186 votes in the data. This reduction of data may seem grievous, but these are the items that varied enough to be influenced by ideology, that were unique, that were not totally dominated by party

whipping, and were locally independent from other items. This sample of 66 votes provides a consistent estimate of political ideology in the House, with party considerations removed. Descriptions of each item appear in table 3 in the appendix along with the a and b parameters for each item.




Figure 3: Expected Number of Conservative Votes Out of 66, by Ideology

Results

Figure 3 shows the test characteristic curve for the 2-PL model. On the Y-axis is the expected number of conservative votes out of the 66, and the X-axis is conservative ideology. As expected, the expected count of conservative votes increases with conservative ideology. The MAP scores and their standard errors are reported in table 4 in the appendix.

Table 1 lists the top ten most liberal and the top ten most conservative representatives by their estimated MAP scores. Note that Roy Blunt, the minority whip, and John A. Boehner, the minority leader, top the conserva-

Table 1: The Top 10 Most Liberal and Conservative Members by MAP Scores.

Liberal			
1	Miller, George	D-CA	-2.13(0.52)
2	Brady, Robert A.	D-PA	-1.83(0.41)
3	Baldwin, Tammy	D-WI	-1.82(0.40)
4	McGovern, James P.	D-MA	-1.75(0.39)
5	Lee, Barbara	D-CA	-1.70(0.37)
6	Neal, Richard E.	D-MA	-1.69(0.37)
7	Schakowsky, Janice D.	D-IL	-1.69(0.37)
8	Woolsey, Lynn C.	D-CA	-1.66(0.36)
9	Moore, Gwen	D-WI	-1.64(0.36)
10	Matsui, Doris O.	D-CA	-1.62(0.35)
Conservative			
1	Blunt, Roy	R-MO	2.34(0.47)
2	Boehner, John A.	R-OH	1.91(0.35)
3	Johnson, Sam	R-TX	1.86(0.35)
4	McHenry, Patrick T.	R-NC	1.79(0.32)
5	Smith, Adrian	R-NE	1.67(0.28)
6	Franks, Trent	R-AZ	1.66(0.28)
7	Lamborn, Doug	R-CO	1.63(0.27)
8	Burton, Dan	R-IN	1.60(0.26)
9	Smith, Lamar	R-TX	1.53(0.25)
10	King, Steve	R-IA	1.53(0.25)

tive list, while majority leader Nancy Pelosi is not on the liberal list. In fact she only ranks 140 among liberals.

Table 2 lists the most likely representatives to fill the ideological positions of the median voter and the veto override pivot. Notice that 9 out of the 10 representatives who are likely to be near the median of House are Democrats. This result indicates that Democrats are as a whole more moderate than the Republicans.

Figure 4 compares the MAP scores presented here to the first-dimensional DW-Nominate scores from Keith Poole's website. The first dimension also measures liberal-conservative ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). The two

Table 2: The Most Probable Pivotal Actors by MAP Scores.

Median Voter		
Davis, Lincoln	D-TN	-0.02(0.12)
Gordon, Bart	D-TN	-0.02(0.12)
Ross, Mike	D-AR	-0.01(0.12)
Tanner, John S.	D-TN	0.01(0.11)
Gilchrest, Wayne T.	R-MD	0.03(0.12)
McIntyre, Mike	D-NC	0.03(0.11)
Carney, Christopher P.	D-PA	0.04(0.11)
Herseth Sandlin, Stephanie	D-SD	0.04(0.11)
Bean, Melissa L.	D-IL	0.05(0.11)
Gillibrand, Kirsten E.	D-NY	0.08(0.11)
Veto Override		
Johnson, Eddie Bernice	D-TX	-0.64(0.16)
Meek, Kendrick B.	D-FL	-0.64(0.16)
Butterfield, G. K.	D-NC	-0.63(0.16)
Abercrombie, Neil	D-HI	-0.61(0.16)
Boucher, Rick	D-VA	-0.61(0.16)
Gonzalez, Charles A.	D-TX	-0.61(0.15)
Hall, John J.	D-NY	-0.61(0.15)
Hare, Phil	D-IL	-0.61(0.15)
Baca, Joe	D-CA	-0.6(0.15)
Brown, Corrine	D-FL	-0.6(0.17)

measures are correlated at .94, which is quite high and may lead to some criticism that no new information is gained through the use of IRT. There are some notable differences between the distribution of the two measures, despite their high correlation. I discuss these differences in the next section.

Discussion

There are three conclusions that can be drawn from tables 1, 2, and 4 and from figure 4:

1. The Republican leadership in the House is much more conservative




Figure 4: MAP scores vs. DW-Nominate Scores (Dimension 1) By Party

than the Democratic leadership is liberal. Nancy Pelosi and majority whip James E. Clyburn are staunchly on the conservative end of the Democratic party.

2. More Democrats seem to be taking ideological positions in the middle, and there are more Democrats on the conservative side of ideology than there are Republicans on the liberal side. In fact, although Democrats outnumber Republicans 235 to 203, conservatives still outnumber liberals 222 to 216. The House of Representatives is therefore simultaneously controlled by Democrats and conservatives. The extent to which policy will be controlled by Democrats is determined by the extent to which party pressures can overwhelm the ideological preferences of moderate Democrats.
3. Figure 4 is especially indicative of a different conclusion than Poole and Rosenthal (1997) about ideological polarization. Notice the gap between Democrats and Republicans on the Y-axis. DW-Nominate scores have no overlap between Democrats and Republicans, with a sizable gap between the two parties. The MAP scores presented in this paper are plotted on the X-axis and show a sizable overlap. This result may suggest that representatives are not so polarized ideologically when they are not being overly influenced by parties.

Future Directions

The immediate goal is to use the local dependence detection software to identify and create testlets within the roll-call data in order to obtain consistent estimates of ideology while using a larger number of votes as items. How the testlets themselves will end up being composed is also a substantively interesting question. I also intend to estimate and test the significance of a second, and possibly a third, dimension of ideology which is more than possible for IRT. Finally, I hope to use some of the recent work in IRT on score combinations to combine different sources of data which may be indicative of Congressional ideology. Content analysis on speeches and data on campaign donations from organizations are two more ways to consider ideology.

Appendix

Table 3: Description of the 66 Votes Analyzed, with Slope and Threshold Parameters

No.	Bill	Date	Type	For	Against	a	b
84	H R 547	8-Feb	Amendment	226	201	2.63	-0.11
147	JOURNAL	14-Mar	Journal	265	157	3.04	0.46
163	JOURNAL	20-Mar	Journal	265	149	2.63	0.50
184	JOURNAL	22-Mar	Journal	256	160	2.49	0.42
185	JOURNAL	23-Mar	Journal	263	146	2.56	0.51
268	H R 249	26-Apr	Recommit	182	234	3.39	0.26
269	H R 249	26-Apr	Passage	277	137	2.04	0.63
365	H R 1585	16-May	Amendment	136	288	2.32	-0.65
381	H R 1427	17-May	Amendment	154	263	1.18	-0.60
389	H R 1427	22-May	Amendment	163	260	2.43	0.42
421	H R 2316	24-May	Amendment	152	271	1.79	-0.54
446	H R 65	7-Jun	Recommit	152	237	2.29	0.37
447	H R 65	7-Jun	Passage	256	128	2.05	0.59
453	H R 2638	12-Jun	Amendment	244	174	1.45	0.33
471	H R 2638	15-Jun	Amendment	241	179	3.08	-0.27
473	H R 2638	15-Jun	Amendment	239	183	1.41	-0.27
477	H R 2638	15-Jun	Amendment	192	232	3.36	0.17
479	H R 2638	15-Jun	Amendment	155	268	1.63	0.51
486	H R 2638	15-Jun	Amendment	149	272	2.82	0.50
487	H R 2638	15-Jun	Amendment	123	298	3.00	0.71
492	H R 2642	15-Jun	Amendment	110	304	2.34	0.84
494	H R 2642	15-Jun	Amendment	154	260	2.41	0.44
495	H R 2642	15-Jun	Amendment	264	152	2.00	-0.51
496	H R 2642	15-Jun	Amendment	206	211	2.13	0.00
510	H R 2641	19-Jun	Amendment	158	269	2.73	0.47
511	H R 2641	19-Jun	Amendment	123	303	1.89	0.80
519	H R 2641	20-Jun	Amendment	133	298	2.41	0.69
521	H R 2641	20-Jun	Amendment	146	285	1.79	-0.62
526	H R 2641	20-Jun	Amendment	174	257	1.56	-0.38
527	H R 2764	21-Jun	Amendment	254	170	2.79	-0.36
530	H R 2764	21-Jun	Amendment	192	232	3.60	0.18
536	H R 2764	21-Jun	Amendment	203	214	2.77	-0.03
552	H R 2643	26-Jun	Amendment	196	233	2.41	0.16
553	H R 2643	26-Jun	Amendment	167	264	2.62	0.40
557	H R 2643	26-Jun	Amendment	194	236	2.67	0.18
563	H R 2643	26-Jun	Amendment	283	145	1.93	0.60
573	H R 2643	27-Jun	Amendment	188	242	2.73	-0.23
587	H R 2829	28-Jun	Amendment	146	279	2.14	0.56
622	JOURNAL	12-Jul	Journal	240	178	2.30	0.27
643	H R 3043	17-Jul	Amendment	174	250	1.99	0.32
672	H R 3043	19-Jul	Amendment	185	238	3.07	0.25
673	H R 3043	19-Jul	Amendment	254	168	3.90	-0.37
692	H R 3074	24-Jul	Amendment	110	308	2.58	0.83
703	H R 3074	24-Jul	Amendment	268	158	1.06	0.60
710	H R 3074	24-Jul	Amendment	198	229	4.84	0.15
722	H R 3093	25-Jul	Amendment	229	196	3.45	-0.14
727	H R 3093	25-Jul	Amendment	243	186	2.17	-0.23
733	H R 3093	25-Jul	Amendment	165	262	2.59	-0.39
749	H R 2419	27-Jul	Amendment	182	245	2.00	-0.27
750	H R 2419	27-Jul	Amendment	153	271	1.12	0.64
752	H R 2419	27-Jul	Amendment	175	251	0.83	-0.48
753	H R 2419	27-Jul	Amendment	175	252	0.82	0.49
754	H R 2419	27-Jul	Amendment	175	250	0.69	-0.58
756	H R 2419	27-Jul	Passage	231	191	2.76	0.19
770	H R 2272	31-Jul	Instruct Conferees	258	167	2.77	-0.37
806	H R 3161	2-Aug	Amendment	146	283	1.10	0.75
823	ADJOURN	3-Aug	Adjourn	270	121	1.81	0.72
827	H R 3221	4-Aug	Amendment	220	190	2.72	0.11
828	H R 3221	4-Aug	Amendment	169	245	1.74	-0.36
830	H R 3221	4-Aug	Amendment	218	196	2.27	0.08
862	H R 1908	7-Sep	Amendment	263	136	1.42	0.61
863	H R 1908	7-Sep	Passage	220	175	0.89	0.27
1037	H RES 799	6-Nov	Table	162	251	0.68	-0.72
1057	H R 3685	7-Nov	Passage	235	184	2.87	0.23
1060	H R 3688	8-Nov	Passage	285	132	1.22	-0.85
1069	H R 3355	8-Nov	Amendment	168	249	2.65	0.33

Table 4: MAP Scores for Members of the 110th House, 1st Session

Abercrombie, Neil	D-HI	-.61(0.16)	Clyburn, James E.	D-SC	-.57(0.15)
Ackerman, Gary L.	D-NY	-1.35(0.29)	Coble, Howard	R-NC	.72(0.14)
Aderholt, Robert B.	R-AL	.55(0.12)	Cohen, Steve	D-TN	-1.07(0.22)
Akin, W. Todd	R-MO	1.17(0.18)	Cole, Tom	R-OK	.92(0.15)
Alexander, Rodney	R-LA	.76(0.14)	Conaway, K. Michael	R-TX	1.09(0.17)
Allen, Thomas H.	D-ME	-.85(0.19)	Conyers, John Jr.	D-MI	-1.16(0.24)
Altmire, Jason	D-PA	.38(0.12)	Cooper, Jim	D-TN	-.17(0.12)
Andrews, Robert E.	D-NJ	-.77(0.19)	Costa, Jim	D-CA	-.23(0.12)
Arcuri, Michael A.	D-NY	-.46(0.14)	Costello, Jerry F.	D-IL	-.29(0.13)
Baca, Joe	D-CA	-.6(0.15)	Courtney, Joe	D-CT	-.92(0.20)
Bachmann, Michele	R-MN	1.41(0.22)	Cramer, Robert E. (Bud) Jr.	D-AL	.1(0.12)
Bachus, Spencer	R-AL	.63(0.13)	Crenshaw, Ander	R-FL	.46(0.12)
Baird, Brian	D-WA	-.79(0.18)	Crowley, Joseph	D-NY	-.99(0.21)
Baker, Richard H.	R-LA	.94(0.16)	Cubin, Barbara	R-WY	1.1(0.22)
Baldwin, Tammy	D-WI	-1.82(0.40)	Cuellar, Henry	D-TX	.13(0.11)
Barrett, J. Gresham	R-SC	1.24(0.19)	Culberson, John Abney	R-TX	1.47(0.24)
Barrow, John	D-GA	.47(0.12)	Cummings, Elijah E.	D-MD	-1.19(0.25)
Bartlett, Roscoe G.	R-MD	.81(0.14)	Davis, Artur	D-AL	-.12(0.12)
Barton, Joe	R-TX	1.39(0.22)	Davis, Susan A.	D-CA	-.96(0.20)
Bean, Melissa L.	D-IL	.05(0.11)	Davis, Danny K.	D-IL	-1.52(0.33)
Becerra, Xavier	D-CA	-1.32(0.28)	Davis, Geoff	R-KY	.9(0.16)
Berkley, Shelley	D-NV	-.45(0.14)	Davis, David	R-TN	1.49(0.24)
Berman, Howard L.	D-CA	-1.16(0.25)	Davis, Lincoln	D-TN	-.02(0.12)
Berry, Marion	D-AR	-.34(0.13)	Davis, Jo Ann	R-VA	.75(0.67)
Biggert, Judy	R-IL	.25(0.11)	Davis, Tom	R-VA	.23(0.11)
Bilbray, Brian P.	R-CA	.84(0.15)	Deal, Nathan	R-GA	1.24(0.20)
Bilirakis, Gus M.	R-FL	.87(0.15)	DeFazio, Peter A.	D-OR	-.51(0.15)
Bishop, Sanford D. Jr.	D-GA	-.4(0.13)	DeGette, Diana	D-CO	-1.48(0.32)
Bishop, Timothy H.	D-NY	-1.17(0.24)	Delahunt, William D.	D-MA	-1.09(0.23)
Bishop, Rob	R-UT	.96(0.16)	DeLauro, Rosa L.	D-CT	-1.11(0.23)
Blackburn, Marsha	R-TN	1.36(0.22)	Dent, Charles W.	R-PA	.55(0.12)
Blumenauer, Earl	D-OR	-.92(0.20)	Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	R-FL	.31(0.11)
Blunt, Roy	R-MO	2.34(0.47)	Diaz-Balart, Mario	R-FL	.4(0.12)
Boehner, John A.	R-OH	1.91(0.35)	Dicks, Norman D.	D-WA	-.84(0.18)
Bonner, Jo	R-AL	.97(0.18)	Dingell, John D.	D-MI	-.47(0.14)
Bono Mack, Mary	R-CA	.37(0.12)	Doggett, Lloyd	D-TX	-1.05(0.22)
Boozman, John	R-AR	.87(0.15)	Donnelly, Joe	D-IN	.25(0.11)
Boren, Dan	D-OK	.29(0.12)	Doollittle, John T.	R-CA	.78(0.14)
Boswell, Leonard L.	D-IA	-.18(0.12)	Doyle, Michael F.	D-PA	-.86(0.19)
Boucher, Rick	D-VA	-.61(0.16)	Drake, Thelma D.	R-VA	1.19(0.19)
Boustany, Charles W. Jr.	R-LA	1.16(0.18)	Dreier, David	R-CA	.69(0.13)
Boyd, Allen	D-FL	-.24(0.13)	Duncan, John J. Jr.	R-TN	1.01(0.16)
Boyda, Nancy E.	D-KS	-.08(0.12)	Edwards, Chet	D-TX	-.08(0.12)
Brady, Robert A.	D-PA	-1.83(0.41)	Ehlers, Vernon J.	R-MI	.22(0.11)
Brady, Kevin	R-TX	1.09(0.19)	Ellison, Keith	D-MN	-1.14(0.24)
Braley, Bruce L.	D-IA	-.59(0.15)	Ellsworth, Brad	D-IN	.35(0.12)
Broun, Paul C.	R-GA	.74(0.30)	Emanuel, Rahm	D-IL	-1.34(0.30)
Brown, Corrine	D-FL	-.6(0.17)	Emerson, Jo Ann	R-MO	.49(0.12)
Brown, Henry E. Jr.	R-SC	.6(0.13)	Engel, Eliot L.	D-NY	-.93(0.21)
Brown-Waite, Ginny	R-FL	.85(0.14)	English, Phil	R-PA	.49(0.12)
Buchanan, Vern	R-FL	1.01(0.17)	Eshoo, Anna G.	D-CA	-1.13(0.24)
Burgess, Michael C.	R-TX	1.25(0.19)	Etheridge, Bob	D-NC	-.7(0.17)
Burton, Dan	R-IN	1.6(0.26)	Everett, Terry	R-AL	.8(0.14)
Butterfield, G. K.	D-NC	-.63(0.16)	Fallin, Mary	R-OK	1.18(0.18)
Buyer, Steve	R-IN	1.19(0.19)	Farr, Sam	D-CA	-1.11(0.23)
Calvert, Ken	R-CA	.89(0.15)	Fattah, Chaka	D-PA	-1.47(0.31)
Camp, Dave	R-MI	1.14(0.18)	Feeney, Tom	R-FL	1.04(0.17)
Campbell, John	R-CA	.76(0.14)	Ferguson, Mike	R-NJ	.21(0.11)
Cannon, Chris	R-UT	1.02(0.17)	Filner, Bob	D-CA	-1.42(0.30)
Cantor, Eric	R-VA	1.41(0.23)	Flake, Jeff	R-AZ	.61(0.13)
Capito, Shelley Moore	R-WV	.63(0.13)	Forbes, J. Randy	R-VA	.81(0.14)
Capps, Lois	D-CA	-1.43(0.30)	Fortenberry, Jeff	R-NE	.4(0.12)
Capuano, Michael E.	D-MA	-.97(0.20)	Fossella, Vito	R-NY	.77(0.14)
Cardoza, Dennis A.	D-CA	-.34(0.13)	Foxx, Virginia	R-NC	1.4(0.22)
Carnahan, Russ	D-MO	-.66(0.16)	Frank, Barney	D-MA	-1.07(0.23)
Carney, Christopher P.	D-PA	.04(0.11)	Franks, Trent	R-AZ	1.66(0.28)
Carson, Andr	D-IN	-.87(0.20)	Frelinghuysen, Rodney P.	R-NJ	.42(0.12)
Carter, John R.	R-TX	.89(0.15)	Gallegly, Elton	R-CA	.92(0.15)
Castle, Michael N.	R-DE	.2(0.11)	Garrett, Scott	R-NJ	.79(0.14)
Castor, Kathy	D-FL	-.75(0.17)	Gerlach, Jim	R-PA	.51(0.12)
Chabot, Steve	R-OH	.77(0.14)	Giffords, Gabrielle	D-AZ	-.03(0.12)
Chandler, Ben	D-KY	-.4(0.14)	Gilchrest, Wayne T.	R-MD	.03(0.12)
Clarke, Yvette D.	D-NY	-1.16(0.28)	Gillibrand, Kirsten E.	D-NY	.08(0.11)
Clay, Wm. Lacy	D-MO	-1.39(0.31)	Gillmor, Paul	R-OH	.42(0.12)
Cleaver, Emanuel	D-MO	-.99(0.21)	Gingrey, Phil	R-GA	1.34(0.21)

Table 5: MAP Scores for Members of the 110th House, 1st Session, continued

Gohmert, Louie	R-TX	1.21(0.20)	Larsen, Rick	D-WA	-.45(0.14)
Gonzalez, Charles A.	D-TX	-.61(0.15)	Larson, John B.	D-CT	-1.31(0.27)
Goode, Virgil H. Jr.	R-VA	1.22(0.19)	Latham, Tom	R-IA	.64(0.13)
Goodlatte, Bob	R-VA	.91(0.15)	LaTourette, Steven C.	R-OH	.31(0.12)
Gordon, Bart	D-TN	-.02(0.12)	Lee, Barbara	D-CA	-1.7(0.37)
Granger, Kay	R-TX	.97(0.16)	Levin, Sander M.	D-MI	-1.01(0.21)
Graves, Sam	R-MO	1.21(0.19)	Lewis, Jerry	R-CA	.45(0.12)
Green, Al	D-TX	-.84(0.18)	Lewis, John	D-GA	-1.5(0.33)
Green, Gene	D-TX	-.25(0.12)	Lewis, Ron	R-KY	1.06(0.17)
Grijalva, Ral M.	D-AZ	-1.59(0.34)	Linder, John	R-GA	1(0.16)
Gutierrez, Luis V.	D-IL	-.89(0.21)	Lipinski, Daniel	D-IL	-.41(0.14)
Hall, John J.	D-NY	-.61(0.15)	LoBiondo, Frank A.	R-NJ	.34(0.11)
Hall, Ralph M.	R-TX	.9(0.15)	Loeb sack, David	D-IA	-.85(0.19)
Hare, Phil	D-IL	-.61(0.15)	Lofgren, Zoe	D-CA	-.82(0.19)
Harman, Jane	D-CA	-.6(0.17)	Lowey, Nita M.	D-NY	-1.37(0.29)
Hastert, J. Dennis	R-IL	.87(0.16)	Lucas, Frank D.	R-OK	1.03(0.17)
Hastings, Alcee L.	D-FL	-.94(0.20)	Lungren, Daniel E.	R-CA	1.02(0.16)
Hastings, Doc	R-WA	.67(0.14)	Lynch, Stephen F.	D-MA	-.49(0.14)
Hayes, Robin	R-NC	.68(0.13)	Mack, Connie	R-FL	.75(0.14)
Heller, Dean	R-NV	.82(0.14)	Mahoney, Tim	D-FL	.1(0.11)
Hensarling, Jeb	R-TX	1.19(0.19)	Maloney, Carolyn B.	D-NY	-1.35(0.29)
Herger, Wally	R-CA	1.1(0.17)	Manzullo, Donald A.	R-IL	1.12(0.17)
Herseth Sandlin, Stephanie	D-SD	.04(0.11)	Marchant, Kenny	R-TX	1.17(0.18)
Higgins, Brian	D-NY	-.84(0.19)	Markey, Edward J.	D-MA	-1.35(0.28)
Hill, Baron P.	D-IN	-.32(0.13)	Marshall, Jim	D-GA	.28(0.13)
Hinchey, Maurice D.	D-NY	-1.57(0.34)	Matheson, Jim	D-UT	.36(0.12)
Hinojosa, Rubn	D-TX	-.64(0.16)	Matsui, Doris O.	D-CA	-1.62(0.35)
Hirono, Mazie K.	D-HI	-1.34(0.28)	McCarthy, Kevin	R-CA	.97(0.16)
Hobson, David L.	R-OH	.68(0.13)	McCarthy, Carolyn	D-NY	-1.16(0.24)
Hodes, Paul W.	D-NH	-.78(0.18)	McCaul, Michael T.	R-TX	.78(0.14)
Hoekstra, Peter	R-MI	.97(0.16)	McCollum, Betty	D-MN	-1.15(0.24)
Holden, Tim	D-PA	-.41(0.14)	McCotter, Thaddeus G.	R-MI	.81(0.14)
Holt, Rush D.	D-NJ	-.73(0.17)	McCrery, Jim	R-LA	.68(0.14)
Honda, Michael M.	D-CA	-1.13(0.24)	McDermott, Jim	D-WA	-1.44(0.31)
Hooley, Darlene	D-OR	-.6(0.16)	McGovern, James P.	D-MA	-1.75(0.39)
Hoyer, Steny H.	D-MD	-1.02(0.21)	McHenry, Patrick T.	R-NC	1.79(0.32)
Hulshof, Kenny C.	R-MO	1(0.16)	McHugh, John M.	R-NY	.41(0.12)
Hunter, Duncan	R-CA	1(0.17)	McIntyre, Mike	D-NC	.03(0.11)
Inglis, Bob	R-SC	.66(0.13)	McKeon, Howard P. "Buck"	R-CA	1.16(0.18)
Inslee, Jay	D-WA	-.99(0.21)	McMorris Rodgers, Cathy	R-WA	.58(0.13)
Israel, Steve	D-NY	-.89(0.19)	McNerney, Jerry	D-CA	-.36(0.13)
Issa, Darrell E.	R-CA	.83(0.15)	McNulty, Michael R.	D-NY	-1.11(0.24)
Jackson-Lee, Sheila	D-TX	-1.03(0.21)	Meehan, Martin	D-MA	-1.42(0.41)
Jackson, Jesse L. Jr.	D-IL	-1.61(0.35)	Meek, Kendrick B.	D-FL	-.64(0.16)
Jefferson, William J.	D-LA	-.52(0.15)	Meeks, Gregory W.	D-NY	-.78(0.18)
Jindal, Bobby	R-LA	.62(0.14)	Melancon, Charlie	D-LA	.3(0.12)
Johnson, Henry C. "Hank" Jr.	D-GA	-1.18(0.25)	Mica, John L.	R-FL	1.2(0.19)
Johnson, Timothy V.	R-IL	.28(0.11)	Michaud, Michael H.	D-ME	-.59(0.16)
Johnson, Sam	R-TX	1.86(0.35)	Millender-McDonald, Juanita	D-CA	-.53(0.66)
Johnson, Eddie Bernice	D-TX	-.64(0.16)	Miller, George	D-CA	-2.13(0.52)
Jones, Walter B.	R-NC	.39(0.12)	Miller, Gary G.	R-CA	1.23(0.20)
Jones, Stephanie Tubbs	D-OH	-.75(0.18)	Miller, Jeff	R-FL	1.47(0.24)
Jordan, Jim	R-OH	1.41(0.22)	Miller, Candice S.	R-MI	.68(0.13)
Kagen, Steve	D-WI	-.59(0.15)	Miller, Brad	D-NC	-.7(0.16)
Kanjorski, Paul E.	D-PA	-.6(0.15)	Mitchell, Harry E.	D-AZ	-.24(0.12)
Kaptur, Marcy	D-OH	-1.12(0.23)	Mollohan, Alan B.	D-WV	-.37(0.13)
Keller, Ric	R-FL	.76(0.14)	Moore, Dennis	D-KS	-.51(0.14)
Kennedy, Patrick J.	D-RI	-.95(0.20)	Moore, Gwen	D-WI	-1.64(0.36)
Kildee, Dale E.	D-MI	-.88(0.19)	Moran, Jerry	R-KS	.81(0.14)
Kilpatrick, Carolyn C.	D-MI	-1.01(0.21)	Moran, James P.	D-VA	-1.24(0.26)
Kind, Ron	D-WI	-.71(0.17)	Murphy, Christopher S.	D-CT	-.66(0.16)
King, Steve	R-IA	1.53(0.25)	Murphy, Patrick J.	D-PA	-.03(0.12)
King, Peter T.	R-NY	.65(0.13)	Murphy, Tim	R-PA	.73(0.14)
Kingston, Jack	R-GA	1.12(0.18)	Murtha, John P.	D-PA	-.55(0.15)
Kirk, Mark Steven	R-IL	.26(0.11)	Musgrave, Marilyn N.	R-CO	1.1(0.17)
Klein, Ron	D-FL	-.26(0.13)	Myrick, Sue Wilkins	R-NC	1.06(0.17)
Kline, John	R-MN	1.03(0.16)	Nadler, Jerrold	D-NY	-1.03(0.22)
Knollenberg, Joe	R-MI	.51(0.12)	Napolitano, Grace F.	D-CA	-1.39(0.29)
Kucinich, Dennis J.	D-OH	-1.03(0.23)	Neal, Richard E.	D-MA	-1.69(0.37)
Kuhl, John R. "Randy" Jr.	R-NY	.47(0.12)	Neugebauer, Randy	R-TX	1.43(0.23)
LaHood, Ray	R-IL	.37(0.14)	Norwood, Charlie	R-GA	0(1.00)
Lamborn, Doug	R-CO	1.63(0.27)	Nunes, Devin	R-CA	.94(0.15)
Lampson, Nick	D-TX	.22(0.12)	Oberstar, James L.	D-MN	-.5(0.15)
Langevin, James R.	D-RI	-1.1(0.23)	Obey, David R.	D-WI	-1.04(0.22)
Lantos, Tom	D-CA	-1.3(0.28)	Olver, John W.	D-MA	-1.31(0.27)

Table 6: MAP Scores for Members of the 110th House, 1st Session, continued

Ortiz, Solomon P.	D-TX	-.49(0.16)	Slaughter, Louise McIntosh	D-NY	-1.28(0.27)
Pallone, Frank Jr.	D-NJ	-1.07(0.22)	Smith, Adrian	R-NE	1.67(0.28)
Pascrell, Bill Jr.	D-NJ	-.74(0.17)	Smith, Christopher H.	R-NJ	-.04(0.12)
Pastor, Ed	D-AZ	-.92(0.20)	Smith, Lamar	R-TX	1.53(0.25)
Paul, Ron	R-TX	.53(0.14)	Smith, Adam	D-WA	-.51(0.14)
Payne, Donald M.	D-NJ	-1.2(0.25)	Snyder, Vic	D-AR	-.7(0.16)
Pearce, Stevan	R-NM	1.1(0.17)	Solis, Hilda L.	D-CA	-1.41(0.30)
Pelosi, Nancy	D-CA	-.65(0.54)	Souder, Mark E.	R-IN	.91(0.15)
Pence, Mike	R-IN	1.34(0.22)	Space, Zachary T.	D-OH	.15(0.11)
Perlmutter, Ed	D-CO	-.35(0.13)	Spratt, John M. Jr.	D-SC	-.3(0.13)
Peterson, Collin C.	D-MN	-.13(0.12)	Stark, Fortney Pete	D-CA	-1.12(0.24)
Peterson, John E.	R-PA	.63(0.13)	Stearns, Cliff	R-FL	.95(0.15)
Petri, Thomas E.	R-WI	.68(0.13)	Stupak, Bart	D-MI	-.32(0.14)
Pickering, Charles W. "Chip"	R-MS	.97(0.18)	Sullivan, John	R-OK	1.28(0.23)
Pitts, Joseph R.	R-PA	1.5(0.24)	Sutton, Betty	D-OH	-1.13(0.23)
Platts, Todd Russell	R-PA	.44(0.12)	Tancredo, Thomas G.	R-CO	1.13(0.23)
Poe, Ted	R-TX	1.07(0.17)	Tanner, John S.	D-TN	.01(0.11)
Pomeroy, Earl	D-ND	-.18(0.12)	Tauscher, Ellen O.	D-CA	-1.27(0.26)
Porter, Jon C.	R-NV	.46(0.12)	Taylor, Gene	D-MS	-.03(0.12)
Price, Tom	R-GA	1.09(0.17)	Terry, Lee	R-NE	1.19(0.18)
Price, David E.	D-NC	-1.21(0.25)	Thompson, Mike	D-CA	-.71(0.17)
Pryce, Deborah	R-OH	.85(0.15)	Thompson, Bennie G.	D-MS	-.74(0.17)
Putnam, Adam H.	R-FL	1.14(0.18)	Thornberry, Mac	R-TX	.73(0.13)
Radanovich, George	R-CA	.93(0.16)	Tiahrt, Todd	R-KS	.94(0.15)
Rahall, Nick J. II	D-WV	-.35(0.13)	Tiberi, Patrick J.	R-OH	1.03(0.17)
Ramstad, Jim	R-MN	.54(0.12)	Tierney, John F.	D-MA	-1.24(0.26)
Rangel, Charles B.	D-NY	-1.17(0.25)	Towns, Edolphus	D-NY	-.72(0.17)
Regula, Ralph	R-OH	.62(0.13)	Tsongas, Niki	D-MA	-1.01(0.73)
Rehberg, Dennis R.	R-MT	.89(0.15)	Turner, Michael R.	R-OH	.67(0.13)
Reichert, David G.	R-WA	.31(0.11)	Udall, Mark	D-CO	-.36(0.13)
Renzi, Rick	R-AZ	.6(0.13)	Udall, Tom	D-NM	-.87(0.19)
Reyes, Silvestre	D-TX	-.47(0.14)	Upton, Fred	R-MI	.74(0.13)
Reynolds, Thomas M.	R-NY	.5(0.12)	Van Hollen, Chris	D-MD	-1.02(0.21)
Richardson, Laura	D-CA	-.87(0.64)	Velzquez, Nydia M.	D-NY	-1.08(0.22)
Rodriguez, Ciro D.	D-TX	-.48(0.14)	Visclosky, Peter J.	D-IN	-.83(0.18)
Rogers, Mike	R-AL	1(0.16)	Walberg, Tim	R-MI	1.05(0.17)
Rogers, Harold	R-KY	.8(0.14)	Walden, Greg	R-OR	.64(0.13)
Rogers, Mike	R-MI	1.16(0.18)	Walsh, James T.	R-NY	.3(0.12)
Rohrabacher, Dana	R-CA	.93(0.15)	Walz, Timothy J.	D-MN	-.36(0.13)
Roskam, Peter J.	R-IL	.89(0.15)	Wamp, Zach	R-TN	.95(0.15)
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	R-FL	.48(0.12)	Wasserman Schultz, Debbie	D-FL	-.86(0.19)
Ross, Mike	D-AR	-.01(0.12)	Waters, Maxine	D-CA	-1.21(0.25)
Rothman, Steven R.	D-NJ	-.83(0.19)	Watson, Diane E.	D-CA	-1.48(0.32)
Roybal-Allard, Lucille	D-CA	-1.17(0.24)	Watt, Melvin L.	D-NC	-.68(0.16)
Royce, Edward R.	R-CA	.93(0.15)	Waxman, Henry A.	D-CA	-1.16(0.25)
Ruppersberger, C. A. Dutch	D-MD	-.55(0.15)	Weiner, Anthony D.	D-NY	-.93(0.20)
Rush, Bobby L.	D-IL	-1.21(0.25)	Welch, Peter	D-VT	-1.04(0.22)
Ryan, Tim	D-OH	-.48(0.14)	Weldon, Dave	R-FL	1.02(0.16)
Ryan, Paul	R-WI	.95(0.15)	Weller, Jerry	R-IL	.83(0.14)
Salazar, John T.	D-CO	-.15(0.12)	Westmoreland, Lynn A.	R-GA	1.3(0.24)
Sali, Bill	R-ID	1.02(0.16)	Wexler, Robert	D-FL	-.88(0.19)
Snchez, Linda T.	D-CA	-1.52(0.32)	Whitfield, Ed	R-KY	.5(0.12)
Sanchez, Loretta	D-CA	-1.2(0.26)	Wicker, Roger F.	R-MS	.69(0.13)
Sarbanes, John P.	D-MD	-1.28(0.26)	Wilson, Heather	R-NM	.5(0.12)
Saxton, Jim	R-NJ	.51(0.13)	Wilson, Charles A.	D-OH	-.33(0.13)
Schakowsky, Janice D.	D-IL	-1.69(0.37)	Wilson, Joe	R-SC	1.07(0.17)
Schiff, Adam B.	D-CA	-.9(0.19)	Wolf, Frank R.	R-VA	.48(0.12)
Schmidt, Jean	R-OH	1.12(0.18)	Woolsey, Lynn C.	D-CA	-1.66(0.36)
Schwartz, Allyson Y.	D-PA	-.82(0.18)	Wu, David	D-OR	-.37(0.13)
Scott, David	D-GA	-.6(0.16)	Wynn, Albert Russell	D-MD	-1.1(0.24)
Scott, Robert C. "Bobby"	D-VA	-1.15(0.24)	Yarmuth, John A.	D-KY	-.69(0.16)
Sensenbrenner, F. James Jr.	R-WI	.98(0.16)	Young, Don	R-AK	.8(0.15)
Serrano, Jos E.	D-NY	-1.13(0.23)	Young, C. W. Bill	R-FL	.58(0.13)
Sessions, Pete	R-TX	1.38(0.27)			
Sestak, Joe	D-PA	-.47(0.14)			
Shadegg, John B.	R-AZ	1.13(0.18)			
Shays, Christopher	R-CT	.27(0.12)			
Shea-Porter, Carol	D-NH	-1.1(0.23)			
Sherman, Brad	D-CA	-.67(0.16)			
Shimkus, John	R-IL	.63(0.13)			
Shuler, Heath	D-NC	.33(0.11)			
Shuster, Bill	R-PA	1.1(0.17)			
Simpson, Michael K.	R-ID	.45(0.12)			
Sires, Albio	D-NJ	-.83(0.18)			
Skelton, Ike	D-MO	-.15(0.12)			

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