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Models of Intertemporal Choice Wand, Jonathan Uploaded 07-26-2004 Keywords choice extremal process utility maximizing dynamic discrete lagged dependent variable panel Abstract In this paper, I consider the behavior of individuals making repeated choices over a finite set of discrete alternatives. Individuals are assumed to maximize utility each time they are faced with a choice, without affecting the utility or availability of future choices. I build on a class of models where serial correlation in choices is due to a process of learning over time about the merits of alternatives, rather than due to unobserved persistent effects. I provide new analytical results for characterizing transition probabilities between choices without imposing restrictions on how the systematic component of utilities may change over time.

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Statistical Analysis of Finite Choice Models in Extensive Form Signorino, Curtis S. Uploaded 03-23-1999 Keywords random utility discrete choice strategic equilibrium finite choice game theory Abstract (not transcribed)

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Statistical Analysis of Finite Choice Models in Extensive Form Signorino, Curtis S. Uploaded 07-09-1999 Keywords random utility discrete choice strategic equilibrium finite choice game theory Abstract Social scientists are often confronted with theories where one or more actors make choices over finite sets of options leading to a finite set of outcomes. Such theories have addressed everything from whether states go to war, to how citizens or senators vote, to the form of transportation taken by commuters. Over the last thirty years, the most common way to analyze finite (or discrete) choice data has been to use nonstrategic random utility models, even when the theory posited as generating the data is explicitly strategic. Moreover, the source of uncertainty --- what makes the utility random --- is often paid little attention. In this paper, I generalize an entire class of statistical finite choice models, with both well-known and new nonstrategic and strategic special cases. I demonstrate how to derive statistical models from theoretical finite choice models and, in doing so, I address the statistical implications of three sources of uncertainty: agent error, private information about payoffs, and unobserved variation in regressors. I provide conditions for the types of choice structures that result in observationally equivalent statistical models. For strategic choice models, the type of uncertainty matters, resulting in observationally nonequivalent statistical models. Moreover, misspecifying the type of uncertainty in strategic models leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. Version: June 22, 1999

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Paper

Is Instrumental Rationality a Universal Phenomenon? Bennett, D. Scott Stamm, Allan C. Uploaded 04-22-1998 Keywords rational expected utility preferences game theory Abstract This paper examines whether the expected utility theory of war explains international conflict equally well across all regions and time-periods as a way of examining whether instrumental rationality is a universal phenomenon. In the rational choice literature, scholars typically assume that decision-makers are purposive egoistic decision-makers with common preferences across various outcomes. However, critics of the assumption have suggested that preferences and decision structures vary as a function of polity type, culture and learning among state leaders. There have been few attempts to directly examine this assumption and evaluate whether it seems empirically justified. In this paper we attempt to test the assumption of common instrumental rationality, examining several competing hypotheses about the nature of decision making in international relations and expectations about where and when instrumental rationality should be most readily observable. In particular, we want to explore the effects of regional learning to discover if there is a difference by region and over time in the outbreak of war and the predictions of the expected utility model. We find important differences both over regions and over time in how the predictions of expected utility theory fit actual conflict occurrence.

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Paper

Is Instrumental Rationality a Universal Phenomenon? Bennett, D. Scott Stam, III, Allan C. Uploaded 04-22-1998 Keywords rational expected utility preferences game theory Abstract This paper examines whether the expected utility theory of war explains international conflict equally well across all regions and time-periods as a way of examining whether instrumental rationality is a universal phenomenon. In the rational choice literature, scholars typically assume that decision-makers are purposive egoistic decision-makers with common preferences across various outcomes. However, critics of the assumption have suggested that preferences and decision structures vary as a function of polity type, culture and learning among state leaders. There have been few attempts to directly examine this assumption and evaluate whether it seems empirically justified. In this paper we attempt to test the assumption of common instrumental rationality, examining several competing hypotheses about the nature of decision making in international relations and expectations about where and when instrumental rationality should be most readily observable. In particular, we want to explore the effects of regional learning to discover if there is a difference by region and over time in the outbreak of war and the predictions of the expected utility model. We find important differences both over regions and over time in how the predictions of expected utility theory fit actual conflict occurrence.

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Paper

Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring Alliance Portfolio Similarity Signorino, Curtis S. Ritter, Jeffery M. Uploaded 04-02-1997 Keywords alliances tau-b similarity utility risk ordinal Abstract The pattern of alliance commitments among states is commonly assumed to reflect the extent to which states have common or conflicting security interests. For the past twenty years, Kendall's tau-b has been used to measure the similarity between two nations' ``portfolios'' of alliance commitments. Widely employed indicators of systemic polarity, state utility, and state risk propensity all rely upon tau-b. We demonstrate that tau-b is inappropriate for measuring the similarity of states' alliance commitments. We develop an alternative measure of alliance portfolio similiarity, S, which avoids many of the problems associated with tau-b, and we use data on alliances among European states to compare the effects of S versus tau-b in measures of utility and risk propensity. Finally, we identify several problems with inferring state interest from alliance commitments and we provide a method to overcome those problems using S in combination with data on alliances, trade, UN votes, diplomatic missions, and other types of state interaction.

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Paper

Bargaining and Society: A Statistical Model of the Ultimatum Game Signorino, Curtis Uploaded 07-18-2007 Keywords bargaining random utility models strategic ultimatum game equilibrium stochastic Abstract In this paper we derive a statistical estimator for the popular Ultimatum bargaining game. Using monte carlo data generated by a strategic bargaining process, we show that the estimator correctly recovers the relationship between dependent variables, such as the proposed division and bargaining failure, relative to substantive variables that comprise players' utilities. We then use the model to analyze bargaining data in a number of contexts. The current example examines the effects of demographics on bargaining behavior in experiments conducted on U.S. and Russian participants.

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Paper

Scaling the Critics: Uncovering the Latent Dimensions of Movie Criticism with An Item Response Approach Peress, Michael Spirling, Arthur Uploaded 07-04-2008 Keywords threshold utility model film ideal points Abstract We study the critical opinions of expert movie reviewers as an item response problem. We develop a framework that models an individual's decision to approve or disapprove of an item. Using this framework, we are able to recover the locations of movies and ideal points of critics in the same multi-dimensional space. We demonstrate that a three dimensional model captures much of the variation in critical opinions. The first dimension signifies movie 'quality' while the other two connote the nature and subject matter of the films. We then demonstrate that the dimensions uncovered from our 'threshold utility model' are statistically significant predictors of a movie's success, and are particularly useful in predicting the success of `independent' films.

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Paper

Competing Solutions to the Principal-Agent Model Haptonstahl, Stephen Uploaded 07-23-2009 Keywords bargaining principal agent risk aversion fairness quantal response equilibrium strategic statistical model random utility experiment Abstract Principal-Agent (PA) theory has been used for over three decades to model the relationship between an information-advantaged Agent and a Principal able to issue a contract ultimatum. For its common implementation as a game, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is reasonably simple but generally wrong in predicting experimental or observational data. This paper implements PA theory theoretically and statistically as two kinds of strategic statistical model, then develops methods for testing competing behavioral hypotheses. I show that subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, risk aversion/affinity, distributive justice/fairness theories, agent error, and random utility can be observationally distinct and how they might be distinguished statistically.

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Poster

Beyond Voting: A Generalized Model of Political Participation Levin, Ines Uploaded 07-23-2010 Keywords political participation latent class analysis finite mixture modeling random utility models scobit Abstract For decades political scientists have studied the motives underlying individual engagement in political activities, but the field still lacks a comprehensive study taking into account the commonalities between different forms of political engagement. It is likely that some of the factors that affect the decision to vote also affect the choice of working for a campaign or donating money, as well as engagement in other political endeavors. In this paper I construct a model that allows measuring how observed individual attributes influence decisions to participate specific activities, as well as identifying common patterns of behavior across different form of activism. Most importantly, since empirical models cannot possibly account for all factors affecting participation decisions, and since other factors are likely to follow heterogeneous distributions across the population, I develop a generalized specification where respondents are classified into classes with lower or greater propensities toward civic voluntarism depending on the distribution of unobserved attributes. If underlying heterogeneities have considerable effects on propensities toward participation, learning about these heterogeneities is important for gaining a better understanding of how well activists and elected candidates represent diverse constituencies, and is also useful for the design of mobilization campaigns. I applied this model to survey data collected during the 2008 electoral period and found that while a relatively small proportion of individuals exhibited high propensity toward participation and were fairly sensitive to variations in variables such as education attainment, most respondents were assigned to a group with low tendencies toward activism and low sensitivity to changes in observable attributes.