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Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems Gschwend, Thomas Uploaded 08-22-2001 Keywords Ticket Splitting Strategic Voting Mixed Electoral Systems MNL Multiple Imputation Abstract This work attempts to refocus the discussion about strategic voting from its narrow focus on single-member district systems. It provides several contribution to the literature on strategic voting, ticket-splitting and on electoral systems. My first contribution is to allow the electoral institutions to vary, thereby opening up the possibility to provide different incentives to operate at the same time for the same voter. I offer a theory that particular institutions not only determine the emph{degree} of strategic voting, but also the emph{kind} of strategies voters employ. In mixed electoral systems strategic voting has two facets. Strategic voters employ either a emph{wasted-vote strategy} or a emph{coalition insurance strategy}. My second contribution is to provide evidence that people vary in their emph{proclivity} to vote strategically, as determined by various motivational factors as well as their capability to comprehend the strategic implications that are offered by particular electoral rules. Evidence supporting these contributions is stemming from an appropriate choice-model using individual-level data from the 1998 German National Election Study

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Ticket-splitting and Strategic Voting Gschwend, Thomas Uploaded 08-22-2000 Keywords Ticket Splitting Strategic voting Germany EI Multiple imputation Abstract Germany provides an especially interesting case for the study of strategic voting because a two-ballot system is used. Voters are encouraged to split their votes using different strategies. I disentangle different types of strategic voting that have been mixed in the literature so far: On the first vote there is emph{tactical} voting, and on the second vote there is emph{loan} voting. Therefore, I focus particularly on ticket splitting patterns. The data set I use contains official election results of first and second votes for all German districts from the federal election of 1998. To obtain estimates that determines quantity of straight and split ticket voting between political parties I employ King's EI for a first-stage analysis and use these estimates as independent variables in second-stage models. In order to account for the uncertainty in first-stage EI-point estimates I use a multiple imputation approach. I show that tactical and loan voters secured the representation of FDP and the Greens in the German Parliament. Several validation attempts of the second-stage prediction results prove that not every second-stage analysis based on first stage EI-point estimates is doomed to fail.

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Is Ticket Splitting Strategic? Evidence from the 1998 Election in Germany Gschwend, Thomas Uploaded 04-20-2000 Keywords ticket splitting strategic voting Germany election MNP Abstract Germany provides an especially interesting case for the study of strategic voting because they use a two-ballot system on Election Day. Voters are encouraged to split their votes using different strategies. The paper is an example of how much more can be learned if we reconsider and refine our theories. I provide a first step towards a theory of strategic voting and add it to the typical ticket splitting discussion. In order to test more refined hypotheses about ticket splitting and strategic voting I use cross-sectional data from the German National Post Election Study of 1998. Empirically, the results indicate that strategic voters are different from ordinary ticket splitters. Evidence from separate MNP estimation for East and West Germany shows that identifier of the FDP or the Greens are more likely strategic voters as opposed to non-strategic ticket splitters. Non-strategic ticket splitters in East Germany do not feel close to any political party. In West Germany non-strategic ticket splitters have conflicting party preferences. Thus, it proves useful to separate out strategic voters from ordinary ticket splitters in future work.

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Rational Expectations Coordinating Voting in American Presidential and House Elections Mebane, Walter R. Uploaded 07-08-1998 Keywords coordinating voting probabilistic voting spatial voting retrospective voting policy moderation presidential elections congressional elections ticket splitting rational expectations voter equilibrium Bayesian-Nash equilibrium generalized extreme value model nonparametric Monte Carlo integration maximum likelihood Abstract I define a probabilistic model of individuals' presidential-year vote choices for President and for the House of Representatives in which there is a coordinating (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium among voters based on rational expectations each voter has about the election outcomes. I estimate the model using data from the six American National Election Study Pre-/Post-Election Surveys of years 1976--1996. The coordinating model passes a variety of tests, including a test against a majoritarian model in which there is rational ticket splitting but no coordination. The results give strong individual-level support to Alesina and Rosenthal's theory that voters balance institutions in order to moderate policy. The estimates describe vote choices that strongly emphasize the presidential candidates. I also find that a voter who says economic conditions have improved puts more weight on a discrepancy between the voter's ideal point and government policy with a Democratic President than on a discrepancy of the same size with a Republican President.