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Below results based on the criteria 'system'
Total number of records returned: 3
Congressional Campaign Contributions, District Service and Electoral Outcomes in the United States: Statistical Tests of a Formal Game Model with Nonlinear Dynamics
Mebane, Walter R.
Whitney embedding theorem
multivariate normal distribution
Using a two-stage game model of congressional campaigns, the second stage being a system of ordinary differential equations, I argue that candidates, political parties and financial contributors interact strategically in American congressional elections in a way that is inherently nonlinear. Congressional races in which the incumbent faces a challenge are generated by dynamical systems that have Hopf bifurcations: a small change in the challenger's quality or in the type of district service can change a stable incumbent advantage into an oscillating race in which the incumbent's chances are uncertain. The normal form equations for such a system inspire a statistical model that can recover qualitative features of the dynamics from cross-sectional data. I estimate and test the model using data from the 1984 and 1986 election periods for political action committee campaign contributions, intergovernmental transfers and general election vote shares.
A System Model of American Macro Politics
Erikson, Robert S.
The paper develops a single macro-level model of American politics based upon the research program of The Macro Polity, (Cambridge, in press). The multi-equation simulation model is constructed from individual regressions on core elements such as Presidential Approval, Macropartisanship, Public Policy Mood, Elections (House, Senate, and Presidency), Policy Activity (House, Senate, and Presidency), Policy (laws) and the lagged feedbacks involved in the full structure of relationships. (Economic performance indicators are also both caused by and causes of the political variables.) In trial analyses, not implementing the full power of simulation methods, the model is tweaked to examine the impact of changing historical outcomes to observe system behavior. Two of them are a shock to unemployment and reversing the outcome of the 1980 presidential election. These are seen to produce unexpected outcomes when the full range of interconnections is allowed to work.
Moments in Time: Studying European Conflict using a Change-Point Model
Constructivist theories provide insights into understanding systemic violence in Europe by accounting for preference formation in multiple time periods. Thus, constructivism explains how the influence of a set of independent variables on a dependent variable can change over time. By allowing preferences to change, constructivist theories accounts for changes in the direction and statistical significance of weakly exogenous explanatory variables over multiple time periods. Owing to this, different rationalist theories may be appropriate to explain different time periods. To test this, counts of militarized interstate dispute involving European states from 1870 to 2001 are analyzed. Bayesian MCMC change-point models provide an effective tool for identifying multiple time periods and generating unbiased and efficient estimates of explanatory variables. Because change-points are calculated probabilistically, the determinates of structural breaks are also examined by testing for Granger causality. Results generate support for constructivist theories because the influence of variables and statistical significance change depending on the time period. These results differ from tradition models which ignore structural breaks in the dependent variable. Lastly, Granger causality tests indicate that changes in systemic power and democratization are determinates of these structural breaks.