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Below results based on the criteria 'strategic voting'
Total number of records returned: 12

1
Paper
Election Fraud or Strategic Voting? Can Second-digit Tests Tell the Difference?
Mebane, Walter

Uploaded 07-06-2010
Keywords election fraud
strategic voting
gerrymander
Benford's Law
2BL
American elections
turnout
presidential
House
state House
state Senate
Abstract I simulate a mixture process that generates individual preferences that, when aggregated into precincts, have counts whose second significant digits approximately satisfy Benford's Law. By deriving sincere, strategic, gerrymandered and coerced votes from these preferences under a plurality voting rule, I find that tests based on the second digits of the precinct counts are sensitive to differences in how the counts are derived. The tests can sometimes distinguish coercion from strategic voting and gerrymanders. The tests may be able to distinguish strategic voting according to a party balancing logic from strategic voting due purely to wasted-vote logic, and strategic from nonstrategic voting. These simulation findings are supported by data from federal and state elections in the United States during the 1980s and 2000s.

2
Paper
Inferring Strategic Voting
Kawai, Kei
Watanabe, Yasutora

Uploaded 07-16-2010
Keywords Strategic Voting
Set Estimation
Partial Identification
Abstract We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [75.3%, 80.3%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [2.4%, 5.5%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.

3
Paper
Modeling Electoral Coordination: Voters, Parties and Legislative Lists in Uruguay
Levin, Ines
Katz, Gabriel

Uploaded 04-20-2011
Keywords electoral coordination
number of parties
Bayesian estimation
multilevel modeling
strategic voting
Abstract During each electoral period, the strategic interaction between voters and political elites determines the number of viable candidates in a district. In this paper, we implement a hierarchical seemingly unrelated regression model to explain electoral coordination at the district level in Uruguay as a function of district magnitude, previous electoral outcomes and electoral regime. Elections in this country are particularly useful to test for institutional effects on the coordination process due to the large variations in district magnitude, to the simultaneity of presidential and legislative races held under different rules, and to the reforms implemented during the period under consideration. We find that district magnitude and electoral history heuristics have substantial effects on the number of competing and voted-for parties and lists. Our modeling approach uncovers important interaction-effects between the demand and supply side of the political market that were often overlooked in previous research.

4
Paper
Tactical Coalition Voting
Morton, Becky
McCuen, Brian

Uploaded 07-12-2002
Keywords strategic voting
proportional representation
coalition bargaining
Abstract Most research on voting in proportional representation electoral systems assumes that voters either choose sincerely for their most preferred parties or strategically if threshold constraints mean their party has little chance of winning a seat. Voters are assumed to ignore possible coalition implications of their choices. However, formal models of coalition formation in PR systems, such as Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), assume voters care about the ultimate coalition formation in the parliament and vote strategically in order to affect that coalition formation process, which we call "tactical coalition voting." In this paper, we experimentally evaluate the extent voters in a PR system engage in tactical coalition voting. We find significant evidence that voters, even those non experienced with PR systems, do choose strategically to affect post election coalitions.

5
Paper
Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems
Gschwend, Thomas

Uploaded 08-22-2001
Keywords Ticket Splitting
Strategic Voting
Mixed Electoral Systems
MNL
Multiple Imputation
Abstract This work attempts to refocus the discussion about strategic voting from its narrow focus on single-member district systems. It provides several contribution to the literature on strategic voting, ticket-splitting and on electoral systems. My first contribution is to allow the electoral institutions to vary, thereby opening up the possibility to provide different incentives to operate at the same time for the same voter. I offer a theory that particular institutions not only determine the emph{degree} of strategic voting, but also the emph{kind} of strategies voters employ. In mixed electoral systems strategic voting has two facets. Strategic voters employ either a emph{wasted-vote strategy} or a emph{coalition insurance strategy}. My second contribution is to provide evidence that people vary in their emph{proclivity} to vote strategically, as determined by various motivational factors as well as their capability to comprehend the strategic implications that are offered by particular electoral rules. Evidence supporting these contributions is stemming from an appropriate choice-model using individual-level data from the 1998 German National Election Study

6
Paper
Strategic voting in mixed-member electoral systems: The Italian case
Benoit, Kenneth
Laver, Michael
Giannetti, Daniela

Uploaded 08-26-2000
Keywords elections
italy
strategic voting
ecological inference
Abstract The new Italian electoral system has two elements, a plurality element in single member districts and a PR element in larger multimember constituencies. The plurality element provides strong incentives for groups of parties to form pre-electoral coalitions. The PR element offers incentives for parties to contest the elections individually. We can think of two types of voter. The first type, whom we characterize as "strategic," votes for his or her first choice party in the PR election since there is no strategy that can improve on this. In the plurality election, a strategic voter supports the candidate sponsored by the coalition with which his or her first choice party is affiliated, even if this is not from the first choice party. The second type of voter, whom we characterize as "non-strategic," also votes for his or her first choice party in the PR election. In the plurality election, the non-strategic voter will vote for a first choice party if a candidate of this party is on the ballot but, if not, votes unpredictably. In this paper, we model the "strategic" and "non- strategic" elements of the vote flowing to candidates in the plurality element of the election. Using data from the 1996 and 1994 elections on both PR and plurality voting patterns in each single member district, and confining ourselves to districts where there is a run-off between two coalitions, we are able to estimate the relative numbers of strategic and non- strategic voters in each district, and characterize this in terms of a range of strategic variables.

7
Paper
Ticket-splitting and Strategic Voting
Gschwend, Thomas

Uploaded 08-22-2000
Keywords Ticket Splitting
Strategic voting
Germany EI
Multiple imputation
Abstract Germany provides an especially interesting case for the study of strategic voting because a two-ballot system is used. Voters are encouraged to split their votes using different strategies. I disentangle different types of strategic voting that have been mixed in the literature so far: On the first vote there is emph{tactical} voting, and on the second vote there is emph{loan} voting. Therefore, I focus particularly on ticket splitting patterns. The data set I use contains official election results of first and second votes for all German districts from the federal election of 1998. To obtain estimates that determines quantity of straight and split ticket voting between political parties I employ King's EI for a first-stage analysis and use these estimates as independent variables in second-stage models. In order to account for the uncertainty in first-stage EI-point estimates I use a multiple imputation approach. I show that tactical and loan voters secured the representation of FDP and the Greens in the German Parliament. Several validation attempts of the second-stage prediction results prove that not every second-stage analysis based on first stage EI-point estimates is doomed to fail.

8
Paper
Is Ticket Splitting Strategic? Evidence from the 1998 Election in Germany
Gschwend, Thomas

Uploaded 04-20-2000
Keywords ticket splitting
strategic voting
Germany
election
MNP
Abstract Germany provides an especially interesting case for the study of strategic voting because they use a two-ballot system on Election Day. Voters are encouraged to split their votes using different strategies. The paper is an example of how much more can be learned if we reconsider and refine our theories. I provide a first step towards a theory of strategic voting and add it to the typical ticket splitting discussion. In order to test more refined hypotheses about ticket splitting and strategic voting I use cross-sectional data from the German National Post Election Study of 1998. Empirically, the results indicate that strategic voters are different from ordinary ticket splitters. Evidence from separate MNP estimation for East and West Germany shows that identifier of the FDP or the Greens are more likely strategic voters as opposed to non-strategic ticket splitters. Non-strategic ticket splitters in East Germany do not feel close to any political party. In West Germany non-strategic ticket splitters have conflicting party preferences. Thus, it proves useful to separate out strategic voters from ordinary ticket splitters in future work.

9
Paper
Analysis of Crossover Voting
Alvarez, R. Michael

Uploaded 02-26-1999
Keywords crossover voting
strategic voting
ecological inference
exit poll analysis
Abstract We undertake the analysis of primary elections from 1980 through 1996 using both academic individual level survey data, media exit-polls, and aggregate election returns on a county by county basis. We come to the following conclusions: 1. there is very little crossover voting in general in United States primaries; 2. the difference in the amount of crossover voting between states with open primaries and closed primaries is not substantively large; 3. thee amount of strategic behavior on the part of voters is extremely small.

10
Paper
The Coalition-oriented Evolution of Vote Intentions across Regions and Levels of Political Awareness during the 1993 Canadian Election Campaign: Quotidian Markov Chain Models using Rolling Cross-section Data
Wand, Jonathan
Mebane, Walter R.

Uploaded 08-28-1997
Keywords Markov chains
rolling cross-section data
macro data
categorical data
survey data
Canadian politics
strategic voting
coalitions
estimation
Abstract We use survey data collected in Ontario and Quebec during the 1993 Canadian federal election to assess the extent to which voters were sensitive to the distribution of positions in special institutions that would possibly be created to handle negotiations between Quebec and the rest of Canada following a referendum on Quebec sovereignty expected after the election. We draw on a theory of coalition-oriented voting developed by Austin-Smith and Banks (1988) to argue that voters' anticipations regarding those institutions contributed to the catastrophic losses suffered by the Progressive Conservative party. We use a method we have developed for estimating discrete, finite-state Markov chain models from ``macro'' data to analyze the dynamics of individual choice probabilities in daily rolling cross-sectional survey data from 1993 Canadian Election Study. We allow each transition matrix to be updated as a function of daily vote support for either the Bloc or Reform to test for reactive coalition-oriented voting. We find significant reactive voting among Quebecois non-sovereigntists. The timing of these reactions depended on the individual's level of political awareness. In contrast, we find no evidence of reactive voting among either Quebecois sovereigntists or Ontario voters.

11
Paper
A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems
Alvarez, R. Michael
Nagler, Jonathan

Uploaded 04-04-1997
Keywords multinomial probit
strategic voting
Abstract Whether voters vote strategically, using their vote to best further their interests, or vote sincerely, voting for their first choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We offer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Second, we incorporate new operationalizations of the objective potential for strategic behavior than have been used in the past. We offer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election based on the varience in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. This is one of many papers by the authors; the ordering of names reflects alphabetic convention. We thank Jonathan Katz and Guy Whitten for supplying helpful data for this project. We also thank Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz for discussions of this subject. Last, we thank Shaun Bowler for his work with us on a related project.

12
Poster
Inferring Strategic Voting
Watanabe, Yasutora
Kawai, Kei

Uploaded 07-21-2010
Keywords Strategic Voting
Partial Identificatioin
Set Estimation
Abstract We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [75.3%, 80.3%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [2.4%, 5.5%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.


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