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Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting Morton, Becky Williams, Kenneth C. Uploaded 01-19-1998 Keywords sequential voting simultaneous voting information aggregation Presidential primaries uniform election days Abstract We theoretically and empirically compare sequential with simultaneous voting elections and the impact of the representativeness of early voters in sequential voting on the electoral outcome when voters have asymmetric information about the candidates. We use a simple three-candidate model where one candidate is a Condorcet winner, i.e. would defeat either opponent in a pairwise competition. However, under complete information multiple equilibria exist in which any of the three candidates could win election. Theoretically, in simultaneous voting elections with voters asymmetrically informed about the candidates, the candidate better known is more likely to win, regardless of whether this candidate is the Condorcet winner or not. In sequential voting, early voters should vote "informatively" and multiple equilibria exist. Using laboratory elections, we investigate our theoretical predictions and consider which of the equilibrium outcomes are more likely. Better known candidates are more likely to win in simultaneous voting, regardless of candidate type. Early voters in sequential voting elections vote informatively and, when given detail on voting by early voters, later voters appear to infer information about the candidates from early voting. The Condorcet winner is more likely to win in sequential voting elections than in simultaneous voting elections when that candidate is less well known. If early voters are not representative of the voting population, there is evidence that their most preferred candidate is more likely to win if they are able to identify their first preference. However, non-representativeness of early voters increases the likelihood that the Condorcet winner will win in sequential voting. For information contact: Rebecca-Morton@uiowa.edu

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Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms Battaglini, Marco Palfrey, Thomas Morton, Rebecca Uploaded 06-19-2005 Keywords sequential voting simultaneous voting costly voting turnout Abstract In many voting situations some participants know the choices of earlier voters. We show that in such cases and voting is costly, later voters?' decisions are dependent on both the choices of previous voters and the cost of voting and are significantly different from the choices when voting is simultaneous. Using experiments we find support for our predictions. We also ?find that increasing the cost of voting decreases both informational and economic efficiency and subsidizing voting can increase efficiency. We find a tradeoff between efficiency and equity in sequential voting: Although sequential voting is generally more advantageous for all voters than simultaneous voting, there are significant additional advantages to later voters in sequential voting even when early voters are theoretically predicted to benefit.