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Below results based on the criteria 'redistricting'
Total number of records returned: 6
Competing Redistricting Plans as Evidence of Political Motives:The North Carolina Case
Wilson, J. Matthew
Redistricting is a thoroughly political act, but the political strategies of the various actors have often been lost in legal and representational arguments. While not discounting the importance of these issues, this paper looks at one set of actors in redistricting --- state legislators --- and examines how they might pursue their own interests during redistricting. Using the 1992 redistricting in North Carolina as a preliminary case study, the paper presents a brief description of the redistricting process, describes the particular circumstances in the state, and presents some comparative analyses of eight redistricting plans. Our findings indicate that members sought to balance individual and partisan interests when proposing plans and that, at least sometimes, individual ambition outweighed partisan loyalty.
Racial Polarization and Turnout in Louisiana: New Insights from Aggregate Data Analysis
Voss, D. Stephen
This paper applies recent developments in aggregate data analysis to newly assembled precinct-level datasets for Louisiana. We validate the usefulness of these methods for answering common voting behavior questions, such as estimating racial polarization/cohesion and predicting racial turnout rates, by applying them to known crosstabulations of turnout by race and party in Louisiana. Then we take the analysis a step further to show how the methods can be used to estimate unknown statistics relevant to redistricting litigation (and their uncertainty) using as much information as possible. In addition to the methodological insights, we draw some substantive conclusions about racial voting behavior and racial mobilization in the South.
The Consequences of Majority-Minority Districts for Representation: Evidence of Partisan Mobilization, Countermobilization and Demobilization
Brandt, Patrick T.
panel data methods
simulated maximum likelihood
Few analyses of the effects of race-based congressional redistricting have used survey data to analyze the implications of redistricting. This type of micro-level data can add significant intuition to aggregate data analysis. This paper looks at whether voters respond to redistricting by mobilizing, demobilizing, or countermobilizing using panel data from the 1990-1992 National Election Study. A 2-period vote choice model is estimated using a multiperiod multinomial probit model, and controlling for the effects of redistricting. Results show that the presence of black Democratic candidates in majority-minority districts after redistricting reduces turnout by white voters for the Democratic candidates.
The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry
While the Supreme Court in Bandemer v. Davis found partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, no challenged redistricting plan in the subsequent 20 years has been held unconstitutional on partisan grounds. Then, in Vieth v. Jubilerer, five justices concluded that some standard might be adopted in a future case, if a manageable rule could be found. When gerrymandering next came before the Court, in LULAC v. Perry, we along with our colleagues filed an Amicus Brief (King et al., 2005), proposing that a test be based in part on the partisan symmetry standard. Although the issue was not resolved, our proposal was discussed and positively evaluated in three of the opinions, including the plurality judgment, and for the first time for any proposal the Court gave a clear indication that a future legal test for partisan gerrymandering will likely include partisan symmetry. A majority of Justices now appear to endorse the view that the measurement of partisan symmetry may be used in partisan gerrymandering claims as “a helpful (though certainly not talismanic) tool” (Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer), provided one recognizes that “asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship” and possibly that the standard would be applied only after at least one election has been held under the redistricting plan at issue (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg). We use this essay to respond to the request of Justices Souter and Ginsburg that “further attention … be devoted to the administrability of such a criterion at all levels of redistricting and its review.” Building on our previous scholarly work, our Amicus Brief, the observations of these five Justices, and a supporting consensus in the academic literature, we offer here a social science perspective on the conceptualization and measurement of partisan gerrymandering and the development of relevant legal rules based on what is effectively the Supreme Court’s open invitation to lower courts to revisit these issues in the light of LULAC v. Perry. (Forthcoming, January 2007 Election Law Journal. Comments welcome.)
Using Legislative Districting Simulations to Measure Electoral Bias in Legislatures
When one of the major parties in the United States wins a substantially larger share of the seats than its vote share would seem to warrant, the conventional explanation lies in overt partisan or racial gerrymandering. Yet this paper uses a unique data set from Florida to demonstrate a common mechanism through which substantial partisan bias can emerge purely from residential patterns. When partisan preferences are spatially dependent and partisanship is highly correlated with population density, any districting scheme that generates relatively compact, contiguous districts will tend to produce bias against the urban party. We apply automated districting algorithms driven solely by compactness and contiguity parameters, building winner-take-all districts out of the precinct-level results of the tied Florida presidential election of 2000. The simulation results demonstrate that with 50 percent of the votes statewide, the Republicans can expect to win around 59 percent of the seats without any â€śintentionalâ€ť gerrymandering. This is because urban districts tend to be homogeneous and Democratic while suburban and rural districts tend to be moderately Republican. Thus in Florida and other states where Democrats are highly concentrated in cities, the seemingly apolitical practice of requiring compact, contiguous districts will produce systematic pro- Republican electoral bias.
Analyzing the Effects of Redistricting on Ideology in the Post-Wesberry Era
During the late 19th century, research has shown that existing norms and rules governing the redistricting process gave state legislatures enormous discretion in the timing and manner in which they redrew congressional boundaries. However, the Supreme Court rulings in Baker v. Carr and Wesberry v. Sanders altered these redistricting rules. Also, the emergence of careerism and seniority privileges created a new incentive to be considered when creating district lines. As such, a process that once fostered great competition and turnover now centers on maintaining partisan control within states. Here, I seek to understand how representatives respond to changes in their districts in the modern era. Utilizing a natural experiment, I find that redistricting leads members of the House to move towards the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum. Additionally, I find that legislative-drawn plans also result in members having more extreme ideological scores, as opposed to districts created by an extra-legislative body.