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Below results based on the criteria 'interdependence'
Total number of records returned: 4
The Spatial Probit Model of Interdependent Binary Outcomes: Estimation, Interpretation, and Presentation
Bayesian Gibbs-Sampler Estimator
Recursive Importance-Sampling Estimator
We have argued and shown elsewhere the ubiquity and prominence of spatial interdependence in political science research and noted that much previous practice has neglected this interdependence or treated it solely as nuisance to the serious detriment of sound inference. Previously, we considered only linear-regression models of spatial and/or spatio-temporal interdependence. In this paper, we turn to binary-outcome models. We start by stressing the ubiquity and centrality of interdependence in binary outcomes of interest to political and social scientists and note that, again, this interdependence has been ignored in most contexts where it likely arises and that, in the few contexts where it has been acknowledged, the endogeneity of the spatial lag has not be recognized. Next, we explain some of the severe challenges for empirical analysis posed by spatial interdependence in binary-outcome models, and then we follow recent advances in the spatial-econometric literature to suggest Bayesian or recursive-importance-sampling (RIS) approaches for tackling estimation. In brief and in general, the estimation complications arise because among the RHS variables is an endogenous weighted spatial-lag of the unobserved latent outcome, y*, in the other units; Bayesian or RIS techniques facilitate the complicated nested optimization exercise that follows from that fact. We also advance that literature by showing how to calculate estimated spatial effects (as opposed to parameter estimates) in such models, how to construct confidence regions for those (adopting a simulation strategy for the purpose), and how to present such estimates effectively.
A Comparison of the Small-Sample Properties of Several Estimators for Spatial-Lag Count Models
Political scientists frequently encounter and analyze spatially interdependent count data. Applications include counts of coups in African countries, of state participation in militarized interstate disputes, and of bills sponsored by members of Congress, to name just a few. The extant empirical models for spatially interdependent counts and their corresponding estimators are, unfortunately, dauntingly complex, computationally costly, or both. They also generally tend 1) to treat spatial dependence as nuisance, 2) to stress spatial-error or spatial-heterogeneity models over spatial-lag models, and 3) to treat all observed spatial association as arising by one undifferentiated source. Prominent examples include the Winsorized count model of Kaiser and Cressie (1997) and Griffithâ��s spatially-filtered Poisson model (2002, 2003). Given the available options, the default approaches in most applied political-science research are to either to ignore spatial interdependence in count variables or to use spatially-lagged observed-counts as exogenous regressors, either of which leads to inconsistent estimates of causal relationships. We develop alternative nonlinear least-squares and method-of-moments estimators for the spatial-lag Poisson model that are consistent. We evaluate by Monte Carlo simulation the small sample performance of these relatively simple estimators against the naiive alternatives of current practice. Our results indicate substantial consistency improvements against minimal complexity and computational costs. We illustrate the model and estimators with an analysis of terrorist incidents around the world.
Beyond Ordinary Logit: Taking Time Seriously in Binary Time-Series--Cross-Section Models
binary time-series--cross-section data
grouped duration models
Researchers typically analyze time-series--cross-section data with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS) using ordinary logit or probit. However, BTSCS observations are likely to violate the independence assumption of the ordinary logit or probit statistical model. It is well known that if the observations are temporally related that the results of an ordinary logit or probit analysis may be misleading. In this paper, we provide a simple diagnostic for temporal dependence and a simple remedy. Our remedy is based on the idea that BTSCS data is identical to grouped duration data. This remedy does not require the BTSCS analyst to acquire any further methodological skills and it can be easily implemented in any standard statistical software package. While our approach is suitable for any type of BTSCS data, we provide examples and applications from the field of International Relations, where BTSCS data is frequently used. We use our methodology to re-assess Oneal and Russett's (1997) findings regarding the relationship between economic interdependence, democracy, and peace. Our analyses show that 1) their finding that economic interdependence is associated with peace is an artifact of their failure to account for temporal dependence and 2) their finding that democracy inhibits conflict is upheld even taking duration dependence into account.
Trade and Militarized Conflict: How Modeling Strategic Interactions Between States Makes a Difference
Rowan, Shawn E.
The study between the interaction of war and foreign trade has occupied scholars from political science and economics for thousands of years. I contribute to the trade and conflict debate by accounting for the strategic interaction between states that most or all theories in international relations (IR) assume. I use a strategic statistical model (Signorino 1999, 2003b) that endogenizes the actions that leads states to militarized conflict and peace. The results of the strategic probit model reveal non-linear, asymmetric relationships between trade dependence and militarized conflict for each state in the dyad. Not only are these effects non-linear, but, in equilibrium, also depend on the actions taken by the other state in the dyad. The trade dependence of one state on another can have either a pacifying or a positive effect on militarized conflict. Additionally, these effects are only realized for initial increases in trade dependence and that once a threshold is reached, the effects of trade dependence are constant.