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Below results based on the criteria 'coalitions'
Total number of records returned: 5
Multiparty Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Public Spending
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the size of the public sector has been a central, and often controversial, item on the political agenda, as governments from Europe to the United States have embarked on new campaigns to reduce public spending. Previous research on the political factors underlying public spending has naturally focused on the characteristics of the governments that make budgetary decisions. Most recently, scholars have argued, and shown empirically, that spending tends to be larger when cabinets are composed of multiple political parties, and larger still when those coalitions include more members. The key theoretical insight is that spending constitutes a ``common pool resource" problem, which is more difficult to solve for multiparty governments than for single-party administrations because doing so requires the cooperation of actors who are electorally accountable to separate constituencies. In this study, drawing on recent research on the impact of institutions on coalition policymaking, we challenge the prevailing wisdom in this area. Specifically, we argue that rules that reduce the influence of individual government parties in budget formulation, and increase their incentives to oppose the spending demands of their partners, significantly mitigate the common pool resource problem and thus reduce the expansionary effect of coalition governance on spending. Our empirical analysis of public spending in fifteen European democracies over a thirty-five year period supports our argument. Our findings demonstrate that in certain institutional environments, multiparty governments will spend no more than their single-party counterparts. Our conclusions also offer hope that appropriate institutional reforms may be part of a political solution to the financial woes currently confronting multiparty governments across Europe.
Forming voting blocs and coalitions as a prisoner's dilemma: a possible theoretical explanation for political instability
Individuals in a committee can increase their voting power by forming coalitions. This behavior is shown here to yield a prisoner's dilemma, in which a subset of voters can increase their power, while reducing average voting power for the electorate as a whole. This is an unusual form of the prisoner's dilemma in that cooperation is the selfish act that hurts the larger group. Under a simple model, the privately optimal coalition size is approximately 1.4 times the square root of the number of voters. When voters' preferences are allowed to differ, coalitions form only if voters are approximately politically balanced. We propose a dynamic view of coalitions, in which groups of voters choose of their own free will to form and disband coalitions, in a continuing struggle to maintain their voting power. This is potentially an endogenous mechanism for political instability, even in a world where individuals' (probabilistic) preferences are fixed and known.
Cosponsorship Coalitions in the U.S. House of Representatives
Grant, J. Tobin
Pellegrini, Pasquale (Pat) A.
urrent theories and methods for studying of cosponsorship assume that the decision to cosponsor is identical to decision to vote. In this paper we develop a new theory of cosponsorship that identifies where along the ideological spectrum cosponsors of a bill are more likely to be. Moreover, we predict that members with organizational ties to the sponsor are more likely to cosponsor than other members. To test this theory, we employ a spatial duration model. This method has recently been used by geographers to estimate areas that are more likely to experience an "event." Using this technique permits a statistical test that supports our substantive hypotheses that cosponsorship coalitions are shaped by the characteristics of the location of the bill, the shared ties to the sponsor, and the policy area. In addition, more active sponsors are associated with wider and less clustered coalitions. These findings demonstrate that theories of the voting decision are not applicable to cosponsorship.
The Coalition-oriented Evolution of Vote Intentions across Regions and Levels of Political Awareness during the 1993 Canadian Election Campaign: Quotidian Markov Chain Models using Rolling Cross-section Data
Mebane, Walter R.
rolling cross-section data
We use survey data collected in Ontario and Quebec during the 1993 Canadian federal election to assess the extent to which voters were sensitive to the distribution of positions in special institutions that would possibly be created to handle negotiations between Quebec and the rest of Canada following a referendum on Quebec sovereignty expected after the election. We draw on a theory of coalition-oriented voting developed by Austin-Smith and Banks (1988) to argue that voters' anticipations regarding those institutions contributed to the catastrophic losses suffered by the Progressive Conservative party. We use a method we have developed for estimating discrete, finite-state Markov chain models from ``macro'' data to analyze the dynamics of individual choice probabilities in daily rolling cross-sectional survey data from 1993 Canadian Election Study. We allow each transition matrix to be updated as a function of daily vote support for either the Bloc or Reform to test for reactive coalition-oriented voting. We find significant reactive voting among Quebecois non-sovereigntists. The timing of these reactions depended on the individual's level of political awareness. In contrast, we find no evidence of reactive voting among either Quebecois sovereigntists or Ontario voters.
Strange Bedfellows or the Usual Suspects? Spatial Models of Ideology and Interest Group Coalitions
Entering into coalitions has become a standard tactic for interest groups trying to maximize success while minimizing cost. The strategic conditions underlying decisions to form or join coalitions are beginning to be explored in the political science literature, yet very little is known about the process and criteria through which interest groups select coalition partners. In this paper, I explore the partner selection process by applying spatial theories of ideology and coalition formation to interest group participation on amicus curiae briefs. Previous work demonstrates that the lobbying efforts of groups can be used to generate a general measure of ideology for any group. These captured ideology scores are used in statistical models of interest group coalition partner selection on amicus curiae briefs from 1954-1985. This research demonstrates that the ideology scores captured for each group are powerful predictors of interest group coalition partner selection, even when controls for resources, group type, and other potential predictors are included.