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Below results based on the criteria 'Monetary Policy'
Total number of records returned: 3
Models of Monetary Policy Decision-Making: Arthur Burns and the Federal Open Market Committee
Chappell, Jr., Henry W.
McGregor, Rob Roy
This paper investigates decision-making within the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve, focusing on the competing pressures of majority rule, consensus-building, and the power of the Chairman. To undertake this analysis, we have constructed a data set recording desired Federal funds rates for each member of the Committee over the 1970-1978 period. We empirically link individuals' policy preferences to adopted policies using generalized versions of the median voter model and alternative specifications. Our results confirm a persistent attraction of the median voter's ideal point; they also confirm a disproportionate influence of the Chairman in the policy process. The voting weight of the Chairman is estimated to be between 0.38 and 0.58 in preferred specifications. Results also suggest that district Federal Reserve Bank presidents have somewhat greater influence over adopted policies than Governors.
Monetary Policy and Wage/Price Bargaining: Macro-Institutional Interactions in the Traded, Public, and Sheltered Sectors
central bank independence
Prepared for Hall, Peter and David Soskice, eds., _Varieties of Capitalism: The Chalenges Facing Contemporary Political Economies_ (forthcoming, title preliminary). This chapter considers the politico-economic management of unemployment and inflation in developed capitalist democracies, focusing on the institutional and structural features of labor and goods markets and the credibility and conservatism of the monetary-policy authority. It reviews the central-bank-independence (CBI) and coordinated-wage-/price-bargaining (CWB) literatures and then offers a synthesis and extension which emphasizes that the degrees of CBI and CWB interact, with each other and with the sectoral structure of the economy, to structure the incentives facing the politico-economic actors involved in monetary policy and wage/price bargaining. The empirical records of 21 OECD countries in the post-Bretton Woods era are then used to evaluate the emergent hypotheses. The conclusion addresses two questions of pressing intellectual and practical concern: the likely impact of and independent European central bank and the roots of the "collapse" of CWB.
The Changing Economic Preferences of the American Public: 1976-1991
I show that the public indeed does have coherent preferences over macroeconomic tradeoffs, and these preferences have changed in ways consistent with not only economic theory but also with the changes which occurred in the American political system during the 1980s. In particular, most people learned something new about the state of the world in the late 1970s, and began to reject classical Keynesian explanations about economic reality. Individuals were becoming more sympathetic to the economic platform of the Republican party---i.e., they began to favour price stability. Moreover, the results support the notion that poor Americans do not hold government policy responsible for their personal economic plight (Hochschild 1981, Lane 1962).