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Below results based on the criteria 'Game theory'
Total number of records returned: 12

1
Paper
Monotone Comparative Statics in Models of Politics: A Method for Simplifying Analysis and Enhancing Empirical Content
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan
Ashworth, Scott

Uploaded 08-18-2004
Keywords game theory
formal theory
empirical implications of theoretical models
comparative statics

Abstract We elucidate a powerful yet simple method for deriving comparative statics conclusions for a wide variety of models: Monotone Comparative Statics (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Monotone comparative static methods allow researchers to extract robust, substantive empirical implications from formal models that can be tested using ordinal data and simple non-parametric tests. They also replace a diverse range of more technically di±cult mathematics (facilitating richer, more realistic models), a large set of assumptions that are hard to understand or justify substantively (highlighting the political intuitions underlying a model's results), and a complicated set of methods for extracting implications from models. We present an accessible introduction to the central monotone comparative statics results and a series of practical tools for using these techniques in applied models (with reference to original sources, when relevant). Throughout we demonstrate the techniques with examples drawn from political science.

2
Paper
Statistical Analysis of Finite Choice Models in Extensive Form
Signorino, Curtis S.

Uploaded 03-23-1999
Keywords random utility
discrete choice
strategic
equilibrium
finite choice
game theory
Abstract (not transcribed)

3
Paper
Statistical Analysis of Finite Choice Models in Extensive Form
Signorino, Curtis S.

Uploaded 07-09-1999
Keywords random utility
discrete choice
strategic
equilibrium
finite choice
game theory
Abstract Social scientists are often confronted with theories where one or more actors make choices over finite sets of options leading to a finite set of outcomes. Such theories have addressed everything from whether states go to war, to how citizens or senators vote, to the form of transportation taken by commuters. Over the last thirty years, the most common way to analyze finite (or discrete) choice data has been to use nonstrategic random utility models, even when the theory posited as generating the data is explicitly strategic. Moreover, the source of uncertainty --- what makes the utility random --- is often paid little attention. In this paper, I generalize an entire class of statistical finite choice models, with both well-known and new nonstrategic and strategic special cases. I demonstrate how to derive statistical models from theoretical finite choice models and, in doing so, I address the statistical implications of three sources of uncertainty: agent error, private information about payoffs, and unobserved variation in regressors. I provide conditions for the types of choice structures that result in observationally equivalent statistical models. For strategic choice models, the type of uncertainty matters, resulting in observationally nonequivalent statistical models. Moreover, misspecifying the type of uncertainty in strategic models leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. Version: June 22, 1999

4
Paper
Is Instrumental Rationality a Universal Phenomenon?
Bennett, D. Scott
Stamm, Allan C.

Uploaded 04-22-1998
Keywords rational
expected utility
preferences
game theory
Abstract This paper examines whether the expected utility theory of war explains international conflict equally well across all regions and time-periods as a way of examining whether instrumental rationality is a universal phenomenon. In the rational choice literature, scholars typically assume that decision-makers are purposive egoistic decision-makers with common preferences across various outcomes. However, critics of the assumption have suggested that preferences and decision structures vary as a function of polity type, culture and learning among state leaders. There have been few attempts to directly examine this assumption and evaluate whether it seems empirically justified. In this paper we attempt to test the assumption of common instrumental rationality, examining several competing hypotheses about the nature of decision making in international relations and expectations about where and when instrumental rationality should be most readily observable. In particular, we want to explore the effects of regional learning to discover if there is a difference by region and over time in the outbreak of war and the predictions of the expected utility model. We find important differences both over regions and over time in how the predictions of expected utility theory fit actual conflict occurrence.

5
Paper
Is Instrumental Rationality a Universal Phenomenon?
Bennett, D. Scott
Stam, III, Allan C.

Uploaded 04-22-1998
Keywords rational
expected utility
preferences
game theory
Abstract This paper examines whether the expected utility theory of war explains international conflict equally well across all regions and time-periods as a way of examining whether instrumental rationality is a universal phenomenon. In the rational choice literature, scholars typically assume that decision-makers are purposive egoistic decision-makers with common preferences across various outcomes. However, critics of the assumption have suggested that preferences and decision structures vary as a function of polity type, culture and learning among state leaders. There have been few attempts to directly examine this assumption and evaluate whether it seems empirically justified. In this paper we attempt to test the assumption of common instrumental rationality, examining several competing hypotheses about the nature of decision making in international relations and expectations about where and when instrumental rationality should be most readily observable. In particular, we want to explore the effects of regional learning to discover if there is a difference by region and over time in the outbreak of war and the predictions of the expected utility model. We find important differences both over regions and over time in how the predictions of expected utility theory fit actual conflict occurrence.

6
Paper
Negotiating Coalitions
Bottom, William P.
Miller, Gary J.
Holloway, James
McClurg, Scott D.

Uploaded 09-15-1998
Keywords Game theory
Experimental Design
Coalition Formation
Negotiation
Risk
Abstract Game theory's best efforts have done little but verify the undecidability of coalitional problems. The typical solution concept specifies the hypothesized distribution for each of several viable coalition structures--but cannot choose among the coalition structures. For example, the bargaining set presumes that bargaining proceeds by objection and counter-objection until potential coalition members are indifferent between the coalitions that they pivot between. Thus, the bargaining set makes a clear distributional hypothesis, but thereby gives up any leverage on which coalition will occur. In this paper, we explore how risk preferences and the nature of coalitional goods influence the coalition-building process. We test a variety of potential explanations with data collected in an experimental setting. Foremost among our conclusions is that the coalitions which form among inexperienced subjects are affected by their risk preferences. We further find that this effect disappears among experienced subjects. We conclude the paper by discussing some of the explanations for and questions stemming from our results.

7
Paper
Costly Information and the Stability of Equilibria in the Intergenerational Dilemma
Signorino, Curtis S.

Uploaded 07-16-1996
Keywords evolutionary game theory
overlapping generations model
Abstract Past analyses of the intergenerational dilemma have identified a number of subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. However, nothing has been said about the stability of these equilibria: how robust they are to perturbation or how difficult it is to move to a Pareto-improving equilibrium. Moreover, it is generally assumed that information is costless. In this paper, I incorporate costly information and analyze the stability of the equilibria, identifying (1) the conditions under which CONFORMIST versus DEFECTOR equilibria will be stable and (2) the degree of difficulty in moving from the Pareto-suboptimal DEFECTOR equilibrium to the Pareto-optimal CONFORMIST equilibrium. In general, the maintenance of a CONFORMIST equilibrium becomes more difficult the more the second period is discounted and the higher the information costs. Additionally, when altruists are included in the model and information is only slightly costly, cycling among the homogeneous equilibria can occur. I show that to counter this instability, conformists should always punish altruists --- that to protect one's own future payoffs, one may need to police the interactions of others.

8
Paper
The Selection Effect of International Dispute Settlement Institutions
Reinhardt, Eric

Uploaded 11-11-1996
Keywords compliance
enforcement
dispute settlement
institution
bargaining
game theory
Abstract This paper examines the impact of dispute settlement institutions on the outcome of international conflicts. Realists contend that such institutions are epiphenomenal to underlying power relationships. Neoliberals argue in contrast that institutions make cooperation more likely by clarifying obligations and reducing transaction costs. The paper introduces some puzzling evidence about the role of the dispute process under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The evidence highlights a selection effect, in which cooperation is more likely at earlier stages of institutional escalation than after the adjudication is complete. Yet why would defendants plea bargain if they know they can spurn contrary rulings? To address this question, the paper introduces an incomplete information model of international bargaining and escalation within the context of a dispute settlement institution. The model generates a number of surprising and powerful results. First, even defendants who do not fear unfavorable rulings will be more likely to plea bargain in equilibrium because of the dispute settlement institution. Second, those disputes that reach the highest levels of escalation---in which rulings are issued---are much less likely to end cooperatively than those that end before the ruling stage. The model thus explains the puzzling GATT selection effect. It also suggests that dispute settlement institutions can have a positive effect on cooperation (contra realist theory), but not through the mechanisms posited by neoliberals. In order to see the influence of such institutions, we must examine not those cases in which they issue injunctions, but rather those in which their involvement is peripheral or merely threatened.

9
Paper
Congressional Campaign Contributions, District Service and Electoral Outcomes in the United States: Statistical Tests of a Formal Game Model with Nonlinear Dynamics
Mebane, Walter R.

Uploaded 07-22-1997
Keywords congressional elections
campaign contributions
campaign finance
district service
intergovernmental transfers
formal model
game theory
Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Nash equilibrium
differential equations
dynamical system
nonlinear dynamics
Hopf bifurcation
normal form
Whitney embedding theorem
divergence theorem
Liouville's theorem
multivariate normal distribution
maximum likelihood
Wald test
stability
asymptotic stability
Abstract Using a two-stage game model of congressional campaigns, the second stage being a system of ordinary differential equations, I argue that candidates, political parties and financial contributors interact strategically in American congressional elections in a way that is inherently nonlinear. Congressional races in which the incumbent faces a challenge are generated by dynamical systems that have Hopf bifurcations: a small change in the challenger's quality or in the type of district service can change a stable incumbent advantage into an oscillating race in which the incumbent's chances are uncertain. The normal form equations for such a system inspire a statistical model that can recover qualitative features of the dynamics from cross-sectional data. I estimate and test the model using data from the 1984 and 1986 election periods for political action committee campaign contributions, intergovernmental transfers and general election vote shares.

10
Paper
Methodology as ideology: mathematical modeling of trench warfare
Gelman, Andrew

Uploaded 01-26-2005
Keywords cooperation
First World War
game theory
prisonerâ??Ă?Ă´s dilemma
Abstract The Evolution of Cooperation, by Axelrod (1984), is a highly influential study that identifies the benefits of cooperative strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. We argue that the most extensive historical analysis in the book, a study of cooperative behavior in First World War trenches, is in error. Contrary to Axelrod’s claims, there soldiers in the Western Front were not generally in a prisoner’s dilemma (iterated or otherwise), and their cooperative behavior can be explained much more parsimoniously as immediately reducing their risks. We discuss the political implications of this misapplication of game theory.

11
Paper
Bargaining and Society: A Statistical Model of the Ultimatum Game
Signorino, Curtis
Ramsay, Kristopher

Uploaded 07-20-2006
Keywords bargaining
ultimatum
game theory
statistics
strategic
rationality
Abstract In this paper we derive a statistical estimator for the popular Ultimatum bargaining game. Using monte carlo data generated by a strategic bargaining process, we show that the estimator correctly recovers the relationship between dependent variables, such as the proposed division and bargaining failure, relative to substantive variables that comprise players' utilities. We then use the model to analyze bargaining data in a number of contexts. The current example examines the effects of demographics on bargaining behavior in experiments conducted on U.S. and Russian participants.

12
Poster
Embracing Methodological Pluralism in Comparative Politics: Game Theory, Data Inspection, and Case Studies
Paine, Jack

Uploaded 07-17-2014
Keywords Comparative Politics
Methodology
Multiple Regression
Game Theory
Case Studies
Civil Wars
Oil
Abstract Inferring causal relationships from cross national data poses inherent difficulties—an unsolvable problem. But the staple method of multiple regression obscures as much as it illuminates. We can do better with the data we have to generate more reliable statistical findings. This poster examines how game theory, simple data inspection, and case studies can provide additional support for well-substantiated arguments and expose concerns with problematic regression results. I draw examples from my substantive research focused mainly on civil wars and authoritarian regimes. Thus, this poster also summarizes methodological themes from my dissertation.


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