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Below results based on the criteria 'Bayesian Information Criterion'
Total number of records returned: 2
Connecting Interest Groups and Congress: A New Approach to Understanding Interest Group Success
Victor, Jennifer Nicoll
Bayesian Information Criterion
The primary challenge in explaining interest group legislative success in Congress has been methodological. The discipline requires at least two critical elements to make progress on this important question. First, we need a theory that accounts for the highly interactive spatial game between interest groups and legislators. Second, the discipline needs an empirical model that associates interest groups and their activities with specific congressional bills. In this project I begin to contribute to our understanding of the complex relationship between interest groups and Congress. I develop a theory of group success that is based upon the strategies in which groups engage, the groups' organizational capacity, and the strategic context of legislation. I predict that groups will tailor their activities (and strategically spend their resources) in Congress based upon two critical factors: whether the group supports or opposes the legislation, and the legislative environment for the bill. To test this model I develop a unique sampling procedure and survey design. I use legislative hearings to generate a sample of groups that are associated with specific issues and survey them about their activities on those issues. Then, I associate each group's issue with a specific bill in Congress. I then track the bill to discern its final status. I create a dependent variable of interest group success that is based on the group's position (favor or oppose) and the final status of the bill. This sampling procedure and dependent variable allow me to make inferences about group behavior over specific legislative proposals. I develop independent variables of group activity, group organizational capacity, and legislative context from the survey instrument and objective information about the bills. To fill in gaps in the survey data set, I use a multiple imputation method that generates plausible values based on given distributions of data. I estimate two models-one for groups in favor of legislation, and one for opposition groups. The ordinal probit models generally support the theoretical expectations. In sum, I find that groups can best expend their resources in pursuit of rules that advantage their position rather than fighting for bill content.
Too many Variables? A Comment on Bartels' ModelAveraging Proposal
Erikson, Robert S.
Wright, Gerald C.
McIver, John P.
Bayesian Information Criterion
Abstract: Bartels (1997) popularizes the procedure of model- averaging (Raftery, 1995, 1997), making some important innovations of his own along the way. He offers his methodology as a technology for exposing excessive specification searches in other peoples' research. As a demonstration project, Bartels applied his version of model- averaging to a portion of our work on state policy and purports to detect evidence of considerable model uncertainty. . In response, we argue that Bartels' extensions of model averaging methodology are ill-advised, and show that our challenged findings hold up under the scrutiny of the original Raftery-type model averaging.