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Below results based on the criteria '2BL'
Total number of records returned: 2
Statistics for Digits
I show how election results may be used to calibrate a test that compares the second digits of a set of precinct-level vote counts to the frequencies expected according to Benford's law. For the votes cast for two competing candidates, the calibration is accomplished by tuning a simulation mechanism that mixes normal and negative binomial distributions so that the first two moments of the simulated distribution match the moments observed in a set of precincts. I illustrate the method using data from the counties that had the ten largest values of the digit test statistic for the major party candidates in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. presidential election. Calibration suggests that the peculiar features of the joint distribution of candidate support and precinct sizes explain several of the large test statistic values. I show that artificial manipulations can significantly increase the test statistic's value even relative to the increased distribution the tuned mechanism is producing. So the test can sometimes detect systematic distortions in vote counts even when the baseline mechanism does not produce counts that have digits that are distributed as specified by Benford's law.
Election Fraud or Strategic Voting? Can Second-digit Tests Tell the Difference?
I simulate a mixture process that generates individual preferences that, when aggregated into precincts, have counts whose second significant digits approximately satisfy Benford's Law. By deriving sincere, strategic, gerrymandered and coerced votes from these preferences under a plurality voting rule, I find that tests based on the second digits of the precinct counts are sensitive to differences in how the counts are derived. The tests can sometimes distinguish coercion from strategic voting and gerrymanders. The tests may be able to distinguish strategic voting according to a party balancing logic from strategic voting due purely to wasted-vote logic, and strategic from nonstrategic voting. These simulation findings are supported by data from federal and state elections in the United States during the 1980s and 2000s.