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WORKING PAPER
Primary Election Systems and Policy Divergence
Fowler, JamesGerber, Elisabeth R. Morton, Becky Abstract We examine how differences in the institutions that regulate candidate nomination procedures - specifically direct primary election laws -- affect elite control over candidate nominations and ultimately affect candidate policy divergence. We hypothesize that in more closed primary systems, control over candidate nominations by ideological extremists will translate into a higher likelihood that extreme candidates win in the general election. We hypothesize that in more open systems, participation by a wider spectrum of the electorate means that candidates must appeal to more moderate voters, leading to the election of more moderate candidates. Using pooled cross-section time-series regression analysis, we find that US Representatives from states with closed primaries take policy positions that are furthest from their districts' estimated median voter's ideal positions. Representatives from states with semi-closed primaries are the most moderate. We conclude that the opportunities for strategic behavior created by electoral institutions have important consequences for electoral outcomes. Keywords candidate nomination procedures election laws policy divergence United States Congress File
Uploaded 10-03-1997 Document ID Number 390 |
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