I define a probabilistic model of individuals' presidential-year vote
choices for President and for the House of Representatives in which there is
a coordinating (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium among voters based on rational
expectations each voter has about the election outcomes. I estimate the
model using data from the six American National Election Study
Pre-/Post-Election Surveys of years 1976--1996. The coordinating model
passes a variety of tests, including a test against a majoritarian model in
which there is rational ticket splitting but no coordination. The results
give strong individual-level support to Alesina and Rosenthal's theory that
voters balance institutions in order to moderate policy. The estimates
describe vote choices that strongly emphasize the presidential candidates.
I also find that a voter who says economic conditions have improved puts
more weight on a discrepancy between the voter's ideal point and government
policy with a Democratic President than on a discrepancy of the same size
with a Republican President.