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WORKING PAPER
Signals, Models, and Congressional Overrides of the Supreme Court
Hettinger, VirginiaZorn, Christopher Abstract Sparked by interest in game-theoretic representations of the separation of powers, empirical work examining congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions has burgeoned in recent years. Much of this work has been hampered, however, by the relative rarity of such events; as has long been noted, congressional attention to the Court is limited, and most Court decisions represent the last word on statutory interpretation. With this fact foremost in our minds, we examine empirically a number of theories regarding such reversals. We apply a split-population duration model to the survival of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions. This approach allows us to separate the factors which lead to the event itself (i.e., the presence or absence of an override in a particular case) from those which influence the timing of the event. We find that case-specific factors relating to the salience of a case are an important influence in the incidence of overrides, while Congress- and Court-specific political influences dominate the timing at which those overrides occur. By separating the incidence and timing of overrides, our results yield a more accurate and nuanced understanding of this aspect of the separation of powers system. Keywords Congress event history models overrides split-population duration models statutory decisions Supreme Court File
Uploaded 04-05-1999 Document ID Number 209 |
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